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I. INTRODUCTION: ON OWNING INFORMATION

Can you own information? If so, what is the theoretical justification for
ownership,' and precisely what rights does ownership confer?2 What is the
impact of ownership of information and ideas on society and on the public
domain?3 These questions have increasingly absorbed the attention of
intellectual property commentators the world over in the global information age, largely as a result of the relatively unfettered rise of information
property rights in recent years.'
1. A number of scholars have considered this question. See, e.g., Andrew BeckermanRodau, Are Ideas Within the TraditionalDefinition ofProperty?: A JurisprudentialAnalysis, 47
ARK. L. REV. 603, 614-16 (1994); Anupam Chander, The New, New Property,81 TEX. L. REV. 715,
733-48 (2003) (putting forth theoretical justifications for Internet domain name ownership);
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, InformationProducts:A Challenge to IntellectualPropertyTheory, 20
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 897 (1988) (suggesting an international treaty approach to modem
information markets); Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualismin the NaturalLaw ofIntellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993) [hereinafter
Gordon, Self-Expression]; Wendy J.Gordon, On Owning Information: IntellectualProperty and
the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992) [hereinafter Gordon, On Owning
Information];Edwin C. Hettinger, JustifyingIntellectualProperty,18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31 (1989);
Justin Hughes, The PhilosophyofIntellectualProperty,77 GEO. L.J. 287 (1988); Adam D. Moore,
A Lockean Theory ofIntellectual Property, 21 HAMUINE L. REV. 65 (1997); Lynn Sharp Paine,
Trade Secrets and the Justificationof IntellectualProperty:A Comment on Hettinger,20 PHiL. &
PUB. AFF. 247 (1991); Pamela Samuelson, Informationas Property:Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter
Signal a ChangingDirectionin Intellectual PropertyLaw?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365 (1989).
2. It has been suggested, for example, that information property connotes a bundle of legal
rights that differs from the traditional "bundle of rights" idea of property. These new rights might
involve rights to control copying, access, use, and disclosure ofrelevant information. See Raymond
T. Nimmer & Patricia Ann Krauthaus, Information as a Commodity: New Imperatives of
Commercial Law, 55 LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS. 103, 113-14 (1992).
3. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, IntellectualPropertyRights in Data?,50
VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997) (outlining concerns about the over-propertization of databases); R. Polk
Wagner, Information Wants to be Free: IntellectualPropertyand the Mythologies of Control, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 995 (2003) (suggesting that the rise of information property does not necessarily
diminish the public domain because of the nature of information as an intangible public good that
easily begets more information regardless of information property schemes).
4. See, e.g., Jacqueline Lipton, Information Wants to be Property:Legal Commodification
ofE-Commerce Assets, 16 INT'L REV. L. COMPUTERS & TECH. 53 (2002) (describing moves in a
number ofjurisdictions towards the increasing propertization of information products); Reichman
& Samuelson, supranote 3, at 52-58 (expressing concern over creating powerful property rights
in databases in the United States); John R. Therien, Comment, Exorcising the Specter of a "PayPer-Use" Society: Toward PreservingFair Use and the Public Domain in the DigitalAge, 16
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 979 (2001) (arguing that the Digiial Millenium Copyright Act will overpropertize digital information if courts do not take an adequate stance on protecting fair uses); see
also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), affd, 273
F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that the fair use provisions ofthe Copyright Act cannot be used
as a defense to an infringement of the DMCA's anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions
as this was not the legislative intent of 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a) (2000)). Cf ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,
86 F.3d 1447, 1455 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding that shrinkwrap agreements can be used to limit a
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This trend has come about partly as a result of legislation supporting
these rights,5 and partly due to the ability of information product developers to utilize contractual and technological protection measures to protect
their investments to an extent never before possible.6 The upsurge in
powerful private rights in information products creates the potential for
unfair monopolies in many markets,7 and more importantly, can reduce the
availability of information and ideas for the use of others This reduction
can have a detrimental effect on those who do not have the financial
resources to pay for access to information that arguably should be
available to them at minimal or no charge.9
This Article focuses on the position of some of those "others" who may
have legitimate interests in information, either because of a need to access
and use that information, or because of an interest in preventing the use of
certain information by an information property holder. These interests may

user's fair use of a product under copyright law, although the relevant database in this case was
arguably not copyrightable).
5. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000) (applying technological protection measures
to digital copyrighted works by prohibiting the use of, and trafficking in, devices that can
circumvent such technological protection measures). Another legislative example is the European
Union (E.U.) Database Directive, which creates sui generis intellectual property rights throughout
the European Union in all paper-based and electronic databases that the creator has expended a
substantial amount of time or money to create, regardless of the standard of originality in the
selection or arrangement of the database's contents. See Council Directive 96/9/EEC, 1996 O.J. (L
77) 20 [hereinafter Directive on the Protection of Databases]. An obvious example of judicial
support of contractual and technological protection measures for digital information products is the
court's decision in ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1455, where a shrink-wrap contractual license was upheld
to limit uses that could be made of a telephone directory made available on CD-ROM.
6. William W. Fisher, III, Property and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1203, 1209-11 (1998); Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contractand Copyright in the Digital
Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 1025, 1028-29 (1998) (expressing concerns over contract law
encroaching in an unprincipled manner on the current intellectual property matrix for digital
information products).
7. Much of the litigation against Microsoft in recent years exemplifies these concerns. See
Kenneth A. Reid, The Microsoft Litigationfrom a Law and Economics Perspective, 9 DIGEST 77,
86-91 (2001); Jonathan Zittrain, The Un-Microsoft Un-Remedy: Law CanPrevent the Problem That
It Can't Patch Later, 31 CONN. L. REv. 1361, 1363 (1999); see generally Thomas M. Lenard,
CreatingCompetition in the Marketfor OperatingSystems: AlternativeStructuralRemedies in the
Microsoft Case, 9 GEO. MASON L. REv. 803 (2001); Sara Stocky & Reuven R. Levary, Windows
XP: Another Court Battlefor Microsoft?, 20 J.MARSHALL J.COMPUTER & INFO. L. 193 (2002);
Will Wachs, Comment, The MicrosoftAntitrustLitigation:In the Name of Competition,30 U. TOL.
L. REv. 485 (1999).
8. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 6, at 1097 (noting the importance of a public domain or
intellectual commons to society).
9. See J.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, Database Protection at the Crossroads:Recent
Developments and Their Impact on Science and Technology, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 793,800-02
(1999) (commenting on the needs of scientists to make non-profit uses of valuable information).
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be grounded in issues of personal privacy,"° moral rights of authorship,"
cultural rights, 2 or rights relating to scientific, educational, or technological purposes. 3 This list is not meant to be exhaustive.
In order to examine and re-work the position of these "others" vis-6z-vis
information property owners, it is necessary to briefly evaluate the
limitations of the term "information property ownership." I must also
emphasize that I will not be arguing in this Article whether information
property ownership is a good or a bad development per se, notably with
respect to the protection of the public domain of information and ideas
more generally. 4 Rather, my concern is with the position of those holding
legitimate competing interests in specific information who may currently
be unable to effectively enforce their interests against information property
holders. The public domain question is considered in other literature 5 and
is discussed briefly towards the end of this Article.
Obviously, the idea of balancing information property rights against the
preservation of the public domain of information and ideas is related to
balancing information property rights against competing private interests
in information. 6 However, the public domain question is arguably more

10. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE & MARC ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW
(2003) (providing a good overview of personal privacy rights in the United States with some
comparative perspective).
11. Moral rights are the fundamental rights of authors and artists to their works. They
generally fall into two basic categories: rights of attribution and rights of integrity. The right of
attribution is the right of an author of a work to have his or her work attributed to him or her, not
to have the work falsely attributed to someone else, and not to have a work attribute to him or her
that he or she did not create. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(l)-(2) (2000); Copyright Act, 1968, §§ 193,
195AC (Austl.); Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 77 (Eng.). The right of integrity
is the right of the author not to have his or her work mutilated in any way or subjected to any kind
of derogatory treatment. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3); Copyright Act, 1968, § 195AI (Austl.);
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 80 (Eng.).
12. See generally ROSEMARY J. COOMBE, THE CULTURAL LIFE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES
(1998) (detailing the ways in which various western intellectual property rights impact cultural
rights); Chander, supra note I (examining the impact of the Internet domain name system on
various cultural rights and legal systems); David J.Stephenson, Jr., The Nexus Between Intellectual
PropertyPiracy,InternationalLaw, the Internet,and CulturalValues, 14 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 315,
316-18 (2001) (describing the impact of a western intellectual property system on New Zealand
Maori cultural rights).
13. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 107 (codifying the fair use defense to copyright infringement,
which protects certain educational and scientific uses of copyrighted works); Reichman & Uhlir,
supra note 9, at 808-10.
14. See, e.g., L. Ray Patterson, Understanding the CopyrightClause,47J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
U.S.A. 365,368 n.7 (2000); see generallyEdward Samuels, The PublicDomain in CopyrightLaw,
41 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 137 (1993); Symposium, The PublicDomain,66 LAW& CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1 (2003).
15. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
16. Balancing competing private interests in information might well be seen as part of the
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closely related to the debate about the initial creation of information
property rights in terms of their nature and scope;' 7 the concern is largely
with the detrimental effect on the public domain of people appropriating
too much information from the "intellectual commons"'" for restrictive
private uses.' 9
The related question of balancing information property rights against
competing private interests in relevant information assumes that we are
already one step beyond the creation of the information property rights.
That is, it assumes the existence of information property. The next
question, then, is how to balance those property interests against the
interests of others who may have competing interests in relevant information. The competing interests may be in the nature of a need to access and
use the propertized information,2 ° or in the nature of a desire to limit the
owner's use of relevant information on the basis of moral rights of

balance necessary to preserve the public domain in information and ideas. See Yochai Benkler,
Free as the Air to Common Use: FirstAmendment Constraintson Enclosure ofthe PublicDomain,
74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 354, 361-62 (1999) (suggesting that some aspects of the fair use defense in
copyright law refer to aspects of copyrighted material that are part of the public domain).
17. Recent scholarship has suggested that the question of preservation of the public domain
and the creation of intellectual property rights is part of a "chicken and the egg" phenomenon.
Concerns about the public domain arise when intellectual property is created. However, the impetus
to create more intellectual property may be a result of concerns by private interests about the rise
of the public domain in an age of unprecedented communications technology, like the Internet.
Supporting a vibrant public domain can also support the creation of more useful private property
rights. See Mark Rose, Nine-Tenths of the Law: The English Copyright Debatesand the Rhetoric
of the Public Domain, 66 LAW & CONTme. PRoBs. 75, 76-77 (2003) (noting that copyright and
the public domain were historically born together and that this continues to be the case in more
modern times); Carol M. Rose, Romans, Roads, and Romantic Creators: Traditions of Public
Propertyin the InformationAge, 66 LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS. 89, 101-02 (2003) [hereinafter Rose,
Romans] (noting the intimate connection between the public domain and private property).
18. A number of commentators in the area have accepted the idea of an "intellectual
commons." See, e.g., Madison, supra note 6, at 1097 (accepting the idea of an "intellectual
commons"); see also Hughes, supra note 1,at 315 (noting that the intellectual commons is actually
more similar to the commons that Locke had in mind than the physical commons). But see
Benjamin G. Damstedt, LimitingLocke: A NaturalLaw Justificationforthe FairUse Doctrine,112
YALE L.J. 1179, 1191-93 (2003) (comparing the nature ofthe intangible intellectual commons with
the physical commons originally contemplated by Locke, but distinguishing the intellectual
common from the public domain and criticizing previous scholarship for conflating the two).
19. On the relationship between the public domain and restrictive private uses of information,
see generally Symposium, supra note 14.
20. Examples are the kinds of rights we currently see in fair use literature in the copyright
context: largely, a need to access information for scientific, research, and educational purposes. See
Ann Bartow, EducationalFairUse in Copyright: Reclaiming the Right to Photocopy Freely,60
U. Prrr. L. REv. 149, 150 (1998); Carol M. Silberberg, Note, PreservingEducationalFairUse in
the Twenty-First Century, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 617, 618 (2001).
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authorship, 2 personal privacy concerns,22 or cultural concerns.23 While this
list is not exhaustive, these concerns have been prominent in information
property literature in recent years.
To date, we have accepted a certain level of information property,24 and
many would argue that we have not been particularly successful in limiting
and monitoring the exercise of those rights vis-bt-vis competing interests
of others in propertized information.25 In this Article, I suggest a new
framework for redressing this balance by imposing legal duties on
information property holders as an incident of their property ownership to
protect certain competing private interests in information. In so doing, 26I
draw on traditional property theories, especially the "bundle of rights"
idea of property with which most of us are familiar. I argue that property
theory can, in fact, help us to achieve a relevant balance of competing
interests in information, and that if we are going to use property terminology, we should learn some of the lessons from traditional property theory
about appropriate checks and balances on property ownership.
To briefly clarify the meaning and position of terms like "information
property" and "intellectual property," it is important to acknowledge that
many of us tend to use these terms colloquially to describe certain private
rights in information that connote some degree of control over relevant
information.27 However, information cannot be property in the same sense

21. See supra note I1 and accompanying text.
22. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
23. See Daniel J. Gervais, SpiritualBut Not Intellectual?The ProtectionofSacredlntangible
TraditionalKnowledge, II CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 467, 469 (2003); Richard A. Guest,
Intellectual PropertyRights andNative American Tribes, 20 AM. INDIAN L. REV. I11 (1996).
24. These include copyrights, patents, trade secret rights, contractual licences revolving
around the licensing of proprietary information, and sui generis database rights in the European
Union. Jacqueline Lipton, ProtectingValuable CommercialInformation in the DigitalAge: Law,
Policy, andPractice,6 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 1, 3-4 (2001) (listing the various information property
assets that are not comprised in standard intellectual property regimes, and questioning why they
might nevertheless be considered "property"); Raymond T. Nimmer, Revised Article 9 and
IntellectualPropertyAsset Financing,53 ME. L. REV. 287,292-95 (2001) (describing information
assets as comprising at least the standard forms of statutory intellectual property law--copyright,
patent, trademark-plus trade secrets, and defining "information property" as something where the
value is in the "use and control" of the asset in question rather than its physical possession).
25. This argument has been particularly noteworthy in the copyright context in the wake of
the enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). See, e.g., David Nimmer, A Riff
on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 673 (2000); Pamela
Samuelson, Intellectual Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention
Regulations Need to be Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999).
26. See generally J.E. Penner, The "Bundle ofRights"PictureofProperty,43 UCLAL. REV.
711 (1996).
27. See Wagner, supra note 3, at 995-96, 998 (emphasizing the rhetoric of control that
underlies much of the recent literature on information property).
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that land and other tangible items can be property.2" This limitation follows
because information is a "public good;"29 that is, "the cost of providing the
good does not increase with consumption, and.., it is generally infeasible
to exclude others from consuming the good." 30
The grant of property rights in information is therefore not necessary
to prevent overuse of valuable resources, 3' which is often the justification
for private property interests in land and other tangible goods.32 There may
be other reasons for granting a form of private property right in
information,33 but it is important to acknowledge that the justification for
the grant, and therefore the nature of the right(s) thereby granted, will
differ significantly from tangible property rights in the "real world."
One of the more obvious reasons we talk about "property" in information is the lack of a better word. Market players tend to use this terminology because they are familiar with it. It seems the most obvious term to
describe a valuable commercial good with which people seek to transact
in a market. Thus, even though information goods are not of the same
nature as tangible goods, the property terminology will likely stick. In fact,
some intellectual property statutes expressly use the term "property" to
describe rights granted thereby.34 Other statutes dealing with private rights
in information impliedly connote property by using associated terminology
such as "misappropriation, ' .. "ownership,"36 and "transferability."37

28. See id.
at 1001-03 (emphasizing the differences between creating property from tangible
goods like land and intangible goods like information).
29. "Public goods" are those goods "that can be shared non-rivalrously by many, and from
whose use non-payors are not easily physically excluded ....
Inventions and works of authorship
are 'public goods' whose creation is stimulated by the limited private exclusion rights known as
patent and copyright." Wendy J. Gordon, Authors, Publishers,and Public Goods: Trading Gold
for Dross, 36 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 159, 164 (2002); see also Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market
FailureandPrisoner'sDilemma in Intellectual Property,17 U. DAYTON L. REv. 853,854 (1992).
30. Wagner, supra note 3, at 1001 n.20.
31. Id. at 1001.
32. See CAROL ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION 106 (1994).
33. See Jessica Litman, InformationPrivacy/InformationProperty,52 STAN. L. REv. 1283,
1296 (2000) (stating that intellectual property rights are created to facilitate transfer of relevant
goods).
34. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000) (declaring that "patents shall have the attributes of personal
property"); Trade Marks Act, 1995, § 21(1) (Austl.) (declaring that a registered trademark "is
personal property"); Patents Act, 1990, § 13(2) (Austl.) (describingthe rights granted under apatent
as "personal property"); Copyright Act, 1968, § 196(1) (Austl.) (describing copyrights as "personal
property"); Trade Marks Act, 1994, c. 26, § 2(1) (Eng.) (describing a registered trademark as a
"property right obtained by ...registration"); Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48,
§ I(I)(Eng.) (describing a copyright as a "property right"); Patents Act, 1977, c. 37 § 30(1) (Eng.)
(describing a patent and an application for a patent as "personal property").
35. See Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831 (a)(l), 1832(a)(1) (describing
criminal sanctions for theft or misappropriation of trade secrets); UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT
§ 1(2) (1979) (amended 1985) (defining "misappropriation" of a trade secret), available at

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 2

FLORIDA LAW RE'EW

[Vol. 56

"Property" terminology need not be avoided, provided that we are clear
about what is meant when the term is used in the context of information.
There may, in fact, be some distinct advantages in utilizing the term. One
obvious advantage is the familiarity of the concept in describing a
transferable good with market value. Another advantage might come from
the lessons that can be learned from traditional property law regarding
appropriate balances of competing interests in property.
For the purposes of this discussion, and to emphasize some of the
benefits of the property terminology in the context of information without
necessarily connoting rights that are equivalent to traditional property
rights, I have chosen to distinguish the two concepts by capitalizing the
"P" in the term "Property" when referring to traditional real Property law
and theory, while retaining a lower case "p" for "information property."
Thus, throughout the remainder of this Article, where I refer to traditional
theories of Property I will describe them as "traditional Property theory"
and "real Property." Where I am referring to our colloquial use of the term
in the context of rights in valuable information, I will utilize the term
"information property."
Although this may seem somewhat strained, there is method to the
madness. The main reason for this use of terminology is to emphasize that,
when referring to "information property," I am drawing to some extent on
notions of traditional Property law and theory, but that I am not suggesting
that information should be Property in the traditional "capital P" sense. I
am instead arguing that where we rely on parallels and analogies from
Property theory to describe aspects of information ownership, as we
consistently do, we should be aware of both the similarities and the
differences between the two concepts: hence, the use of the similar, but
distinct, labels, "Property" and "property."
Information property rights, as the term is used here, can take many
forms. At its most basic, the term relates to information that has commercial value, in which private market players want to transact.38 Much of

http://nsi.org/library/espionage/usta.htm.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 20 1(a) (describing initial "ownership" of copyrighted works in the United

States).
37. "Transferability" is an important aspect of ownership because one of the key rationales
for a property right is alienability. See Litman, supra note 33, at 1295. There are many references
to the transferability of intellectual property in statute. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1060 (assign-ability
of registered trademark); 17 id. § 204 (transfer of copyright); id. § 205 (recordation of transfer of
copyright); 35 id.§ 261 (assignability of patents).
38. See Samuelson, supra note 1,at 365-75 (distinguishing between information property
rights and intellectual property rights, and rationales for and against accepting broad information
property rights); Jessica Litman, The Tales thatArticle 2B Tells, 13 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 931, 93536 (1998) (criticizing the breadth of the definition of "informational rights" in the then-proposed
Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B); see also supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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standard intellectual property law relates to what might be termed
"information property rights."3 9 Copyright and patent law, at least in the
global information age, create property rights in aspects of valuable
information products like computer software4 ' and Internet business
methods.42 Trade secret law also protects valuable commercial "know
how,"43 and trade secrets are generally described as "property" rights
despite their somewhat questionable proprietary status."
There is also a significant amount of valuable information that is not
necessarily protected by any specific intellectual property right. Nonoriginal data-bases are an obvious example, at least in the United States.45
Databases are not protected by copyright law in the United States unless
they meet a somewhat vague originality standard for copyright protection
in relation to the selection or arrangement oftheir contents. Nevertheless,

39. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
40. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
41. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (contemplating copyright in computer programs and limitations on
copyrights in computer programs); Copyright Act, 1968, § 10 (Austl.) (defining "literary work" to
include computer programs or a compilation of computer programs); Julie Cohen & Mark Lemley,
PatentScope andInnovation in the Software Industry,89 CAL. L. REv. 1, 8 (2001); John Swinson,
Copyrightor Patent or Both: An Algorithmic Approach to ComputerSoftware Protection,5 HARv.
J.L. & TECH. 145 (1991) (arguing that software is more appropriately protected by copyright than
by patent).
42. See Jared Earl Grusd, Internet Business Methods: What Role Does and Should Patent
Law Play? 4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 9, *26 (1999) (noting that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has
allowed claims to Internet business methods); see also Jeffrey R. Kuester & Lawrence E.
Thompson, Risks Associated with Restricting Business Method andE-Commerce Patents, 17 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 657, 658 (2001) (noting criticism of business method patents); Matthew G. Wells,
Note, InternetBusiness Method PatentPolicy, 87 VA.L. REv. 729,733 (2001); Richard M. Moose
& John E. Vick, Jr., E-Commerce Patents: Moving at the Speed of Light, S.C. LAW., May/June
2001, at 18. Cf.State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (reorganizing the validity of business method patents); Brian P. Biddinger, Note,
Limiting the Business Method Patent: A Comparison and Proposed Alignment of European,
Japaneseand UnitedStates PatentLaw, 69 FORDHAML. REv. 2523,2524 (2001); Colin P. Marks,
Note, Opening the Door to Business Methods: State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial
Group, Inc., 37 Hous. L. REV. 923, 924-25 (2000).
43. JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS § 1.01 (2002) (noting that trade secrets are defined very
broadly to include "business information, such as customer lists, financial projections and marketing plans" and that trade secret law "can protect any process or information that is both private and
useful").
44. Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (holding that trade secrets
can be considered Property for the purposes of the constitutional takings clause); I RAYMOND T.
NMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 3.3 (3d ed. 2003).
45. The E.U. Database Directive has created a sui generis intellectual property right in such
databases throughout the European Union. See Directive on the Protection of Databases, supra
note 5.
46. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,343 (1991) (holding that a white
pages telephone directory was not sufficiently original in the selection or arrangement of its
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this type of information is often propertized, again in the small "p" sense
of the word, through the use of restrictive contractual licenses and
technological protection measures.47
Increasingly, propertization of information, even in the small "p" sense
of the word, leads to obvious concerns about appropriately balancing
competing interests in valuable information. Many scholars have
commented on the need for various sectors of the community (notably
educators, scientists, and other researchers) to access and use certain propertized information.48 Scholars have also commented on cultural equities
and moral rights inherent in certain information, ideas, and narratives.49
Commentators have criticized the domination by the western world and
western legal systems of property rights in aspects of other cultures, such
as aboriginal art" and music, 5' and words identifying culturally significant
contents to receive copyright protection in the United States). This case may be contrasted with a
recent Australian judicial determination that a white pages telephone directory is copyrightable
under Australian law. Desktop Mktg. Sys. Party Ltd. v. Telstra Corp. (2002) 192 A.L.R. 433.
47. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449-50 (7th Cir. 1996); UNIF. COMPUTER
INFO. TRANSACTIONS AcT § 104 (amended 2001), available at http://www.ucitaonline.com/
ucita.html; RAYMOND S.R. Ku ET AL., CYBERSPACE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 629-53 (2002);
Fisher, supra note 6, at 1209-12; Madison, supra note 6, at 1059-60; Charles R. McManis, The
Privatization(or "Shrink-Wrapping ") ofAmerican Copyright Law, 87 CAL. L. REV. 173, 176-78
(1999); Scott J. Spooner, The Validationof Shrink- Wrap and Click- Wrap Licenses by Virginia's
Uniform ComputerInformation TransactionsAct, 7 RICH.J.L.&TECH. 27, *6 (2001); Dan Streeter,
Comment, Into Contract's UndiscoveredCountry: A Defense of Browse- Wrap Licenses, 39 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1363, 1368-69 (2002); Batya Goodman, Note, Honey, I Shrink-Wrapped the
Consumer: The Shrink- Wrap Agreement as an Adhesion Contract,21 CARDOZO L. REV. 319,33437 (1999). The Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act (UTICA) has been adopted in
Maryland and Virginia and introduced in Arizona, Illinois, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
Oregon, Texas, and the District of Columbia. Carol A. Kunze, Status of UCITA in the States, at
http://www.ucitaonline.com/slhpsus.html (updated Apr. 6, 2001).
48. See, e.g., Bartow, supranote 20, at 150; Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole
Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 295-303 (2003)
(discussing proprietary barriers to entry into biomedical research and development); Silberberg,
supra note 20, at 618; see generallyJ.H. Reichman & Paul F. Uhlir, A ContractuallyReconstructed
Research CommonsforScientific Datain aHighly ProtectionistIntellectualPropertyEnvironment,
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 315 (2003); Reichman & Uhlir, supra note 9.

49. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
50. See, e.g., Colin Golvan, Aboriginal Art and Copyright-An Overview and Commentary
ConcerningRecent Developments, I MEDIA & ARTS L. REV. 151 (1996); Colin Golvan, Aboriginal
Art and the Public Domain, 9 J.L. & INFO. So. 122 (1998) (discussing Australian native title
legislation), availableat http://www.j lis.law. utas.edu.au/v9i I aboriginal art.html (last visited Nov.
25,2003); Martin Hardie, CurrentLitigation in Native Title and IntellectualProperty:Bulun Bulun
and Milpurrurru v. R & T Textiles, 3 ABORIGINAL L. BULL. 18 (1997); Chong Hui-yeung, IPR
Draft Law for Aborigines UnderAttack TAIPEI TIMES, Aug. 23, 2000, at 4 (discussing the draft of
the Protection of Traditional Aboriginal Intellectual Property Rights Law, which is intended to
protect the art and folklore of Taiwanese Aborigines), available at http://www.taipeitimes.com
News/local/archives/2000/08/23/49186 (last visited Nov. 25, 2003).
51. See, e.g., Emil Chang, Copyright Infringement? (Music to a Lawyer's Ears), at
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names and geographical places.5 2 The global community has also become
increasingly concerned about the rights of authors, generally, with respect
to their works,53 particularly their rights to be acknowledged as the author
of a work (the right of attribution),54 and to not have a work subject to
derogatory treatment (the right of integrity)."
Courts and legislatures have played a significant role in over-propertizing information to the detriment of the competing interests identified
above. Examples of legislative involvement in this trend include: (a) the
creation of powerful and exclusive property rights in databases throughout
the European Union (E.U.) under the E.U. Database Directive;56 (b) the
enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA)5 7 in the
United States which strengthens claims to digital copyright by preventing
trafficking in, and use of, devices which might circumvent digital rights
management technology;5 8 and, (c) the recent extension to the copyright
protection term in the United States.59 Additionally, both courts and

http://members.tripod.com/-tfengenigma.htm. (last visited Nov. 25, 2003).
52. Chander, supra note I, at 732 (describing a case involving a woman in Florida selling a
domain name that referred to the name of a tribe of Brazilian Indians); Rosemary J. Coombe,
Critical Cultural Legal Studies, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 463, 485 (1998); Rosemary J.Coombe,
Objects ofPropertyandSubjects ofPolitics:IntellectualPropertyLaws andDemocraticDialogue,
69 TEX. L. REV. 1853, 1873-76 (1991).
53. In recent years, moral rights legislation has been included, to a greater or lesser extent,
in the copyright legislation in a number of countries that have historically not supported such rights.
17 U. S.C. § 106A (2000); Copyright Act, 1968, pt. IX (Austl.); Copyright, Designs and Patents Act,
1988, c. 48, §§ 77-85 (Eng).
54. The right of attribution is the right of an author of a work to have his or her work
attributed to him or her, not to have the work falsely attributed to someone else, and not to have a
work attributed to him or her that he or she did not create. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(l)-(2); Copyright
Act, 1968, §§ 193, 195AC (Austl.); Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 77 (Eng.).
55. The right of integrity is the right of the author not to have his or her work mutilated in
any way or subjected to any kind of derogatory treatment. 17 U.S.C. § i 06A(a)(3); Copy-right Act,
1968, § 195AI (Austl.); Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, § 80 (Eng.).
56. Directive on the Protection of Databases, supranote 5 (creating sui generis intellectual
property rights throughout the European Union in all paper-based and electronic databases in which
the creator has expended a substantial amount of time and/or money regardless of the standard of
originality in the selection or arrangement of the database's contents).
57. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
58. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(l)(A), 1201(a)(2); see also Council Directive 2001/29/EEC,
art. 6, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 [hereinafter Directive on Copyright].
59. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827
(1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186
(2003) (confirming the Acts constitutionality); ChristinaN. Gifford & Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright
Legislationfor the "DigitalMillenium, " 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 137, 170-75 (1999); Note,
The Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, 30 U. MEM. L. REV. 363 (2000).
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legislatures have supported attempts at privatizing copyright law through
restrictive contractual provisions.60
These concerns are not particularly new. Indeed, they are only some of
the more recent examples of a phenomenon that began in the latter part of
the twentieth century when scholars started to debate the extent to which
various computer software-related products were being over-propertized
by the legal system. These earlier examples related to things like the
validity of patents for computer software and Internet business method
patents, 6 1 and the extent to which computer software might be protected
under copyright law as a literary work.62
These issues are not limited to the United States. In the European
Union, similar concerns about the over-propertization of information
products and the ineffectiveness of fair use doctrines to provide adequate
levels of access and use of information to those who need it have arisen in

60. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. UCITA has met with limited success in the
United States over the last few years and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Law (NCCUSL) has recently withdrawn support for it. David Syrowik, Restriking the
Balance, MICH. B.J., Mar. 2003, at 30 (providing an editorial note that NCCUSL has withdrawn
support for UCITA); Press Release, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, UCITA Withdrawn from ABA Agenda Without Action (Feb. 10, 2003), at
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/ucita/UCITAABA_0203.pdf (last visited Aug. 22, 2003).
61. See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981); State St. Bank & Trust Co. v.
Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1531 (Fed.
Cir. 1994); Amazon.com, Inc. v. Bamesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (W.D. Wash.
1999), vacated,239 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2001); David Bender, Business Method Patents:The View
from the UnitedStates, 23 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 375 (2001); Cohen & Lemley, supra note 41;
Grusd, supranote 42; Kuester & Thompson, supra note 42; Russell Moy, A CaseAgainst Software
Patents, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 67 (2000); Swinson, supra note 41;

Biddinger, supra note 42; John A. Burtis, Comment, Towards a Rational Jurisprudence of
Computer-RelatedPatentabilityin Light of In re Alappat, 79 MINN. L. REV. 1129 (1995); Marks,
supra note 42; Wells, supra note 42.
62. See, e.g., NIMMER, supra note 44, §§ 1.08-1.10; Daniel J.M. Attridge, Copyright
Protectionfor Computer Programs22 EuR. INrELL. PROP. REV. 563 (2000); David W. Carstens,
Legal Protectionof Computer Software: Patents,Copyrights, and Trade Secrets, 20 J. CONTEMP.
L. 13, 45-50 (1994). It is now accepted in most jurisdictions that copyright law will protect the
source code of a computer program, but not necessarily the machine-readable object code, although
in some jurisdictions the law may permit the copyrighting of the object code. David Webber,
Intellectual Property in Internet Software, in GOING DIGITAL 2000: LEGAL ISSUES FOR ECOMMERCE, SOFTWARE, AND THE INTERNET 21, 22 (Anne Fitzgerald et al. eds., 2d ed. 2000); see
also IAN J. LLOYD, LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 138-52 (2000); Hector L.
MacQueen, Copyrightand the Internet, in LAW & THE INTERNET: A FRAMEWORK FOR ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE 181 (Lilian Edwards & Charlotte Waelde eds., 2d ed. 2000).
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recent years, particularly in the wake of the E.U. Database Directive63 and
the E.U. Copyright Directive.'
Commentators are worried that large amounts of relatively mundane
information could be locked away from society and may only be
accessible through payment of prohibitive fees.65 These fears are
exacerbated by the fact that the fair use provisions in the E.U. Database
Directive are somewhat unclear, 66 and that E.U. Member States have
significant discretion about the extent to which they adopt fair use
provisions in domestic legislation that implements the Directive. 67 Another
worrying development in the history of the E.U. Database Directive has
been the removal of the compulsory licensing provision for sole source
information providers that had been included in an earlier draft of the
Directive.68 Such a provision would have given some comfort to those
concerned about the creation ofunfair monopolies in valuable information
products.
The arguments against the over-propertization of information in the
digital age are compelling. They are based on very real concerns about the
creation of unfair monopolies in information, and the concurrent lack of
support for competing interests in information. Clearly, a significant part
of this concern relates to whether we see valuable information as
"property" or "Property." The former term largely connotes a useful
transactional tool that can assist in the development of new markets for the
benefit of society as a whole,69 while the latter refers to the

63. See Directive on the Protection of Databases, supra note 5; see also Catherine Colston,
Sui Generis Database Right: Ripe for Review?, 3 J. INFO. L. & TECH. (2001), available at
http://elj.warwick.ac.uk/jilt/01-3/colston.html (last visited on June 19, 2002). These concerns are
relevant in the United States and in the European Union because of moves to enact legislation in
the United States that achieve at least some of the same ends as the E.U. Database Directive. See
Mark J. Davison, Proposed US. DatabaseLegislation: A Comparison with the UK Database
Regulations,21 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 279,283 (1999) (comparing the E.U. database protection
model with some of the legislative initiatives in the United States); Reichman & Samuelson, supra
note 3.
64. Directive on Copyright, supra note 58, art. 6 (containing provisions similar to the anticircumvention provisions of the DMCA).
65. Reichman & Samuelson, supranote 3, at 71; Reichman & Uhlir, supranote 9, at 808-10.
66. The fair use provisions are found in Article 6 of the Directive and include, among other
things, "normal use of the contents by the lawful user," "private purposes," "use for the sole
purpose of illustration for teaching or scientific research," and "use for the purposes of public
security." Directive on the Protection of Databases, supra note 5, arts. 6(1), (2)(a), (2)(b), (2)(c).
The problem with these provisions is that there are no meaningful definitions or any useful
guidance on the intended meanings of terms like "normal use," "lawful user," "private purposes,"
"illustration for teaching or scientific research," or "public security."
67. All of the fair use exceptions set out in Article 6 are discretionary and may or may not
be transposed into domestic law at the discretion of each individual E.U. Member State. See id.
68. See Colston, supra note 63; Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3, at 86-87.
69. See VLADO DiMOvsKI ET AL., MINISTRY OF ECON. AFFAIRS, Gov'T OF REPUBLIC OF
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conceptualization of an asset as a rivalrous private good that can be
commodified to the exclusion of most others. One of the underlying
theoretical justifications for this commodification of Property is to prevent
a "tragedy of the commons" in relation to rivalrous goods."
Our thoughts about Property necessarily influence our thoughts about
information property; that is, we would hardly have adopted the term
"property" in the information context if it was not in some way informed
by our ideas about traditional Property theory. However, we need to be
much more careful than we have been in the past about delineating which
aspects of Property we want to draw into our conception of information
property. I argue that in some ways we have borrowed too much from
traditional notions of Property when conceptualizing information property,
while in other ways we have borrowed too little.
In the "too much" category is the idea that Property rights may well
entitle the owner to a market monopoly (as is often the case with rivalrous
goods such as realty). Ownership of such goods can lead to the ability to
charge high prices for access and use. 7 ' This may well be the case with
many rivalrous goods, like land, but it should not work this way with
respect to non-rivalrous goods like information.72 This is because Property
rights in relation to physically scarce resources discourages waste in favor
of trade,73 while the same reasoning will not necessarily apply to a public
good like information.
In the "too little" category I would argue that we have failed to notice,
when borrowing from traditional Property theory in the information
property context, that traditional Property rights entail significant
concurrent obligations or responsibilities imposed on the proprietary
owner as an incident of their Property ownership. Historically, Property
rights have never been absolute.7 4 They have always involved limitations,
often in the form of legal duties owed to others.75 There is certainly no

SLOVENIA,

STRATEGY FOR INCREASING THE COMPETITIVENESS CAPABILITIES OF SLOVENIAN

INDUSTRY ch. 1(1996), at http://www.tradepoint.si/industrystrategy/pagel.htm (last visited June
13, 2003); Haik Sargsyan, No Alternative but to Stimulate Export in Armenia, ARM. Bus. MAG.,
Jan. 2002, at http://www.abm.am/english/issues/issue I/article2.html (last visited June 13, 2003).
70. See ROSE, supra note 32, at 106 (citing Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy ofthe Commons, 162
SCIENCE 1243 (1968)); Rose, Romans, supra note 17, at 90 (explaining the "tragedy of the
commons" in the real property context).
71. See ROSE, supra note 32, at 28 (noting that propertizing land increases value and
encourages trade in the context of scarce resources).
72. In fact, some have argued that it is physically impossible to control information to this
extent because of the nature of property. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 3, at 1003-10 (describing
how the control and commercial exploitation of specific property begets more property that enters
the public domain as a result of the propertization of the original information).
73. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
74. See Chander, supra note 1, at 778.
75. These may include the duties of landlords to maintain premises in good repair for the
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reason for a trend of absolute control to start now in relation to information
property rights.
Assuming the continued use of the "information property" label in the
modem world, is it possible that we might learn something about legal
duties that could be imposed on information property holders from
examining some of the legal duties imposed on traditional Property
holders? Again, this is not to equate information property with traditional
Property, but rather to evaluate whether there are ways in which the
traditional Property concept can help inform us in developing a better
balance of interests in information property. Thus, we cannot simply
identify duties attaching to traditional Property ownership and apply them
mutatis mutandis to information property. However, we can apply the
general concept of accompanying the grant of a property right in
information with the grant of some commensurate legal duties that will
temper the otherwise potentially unfettered exercise of the relevant rights.
We have already seen some examples of obligations attaching to
ownership of intellectual property. Patent law, for example, requires the
public disclosure of an invention in return for the grant of patent
protection.76 Additionally, the patentee is required to release the invention
into the public domain after the patent term has expired so that society as
a whole may benefit."
However, many would argue that the type and amount of obligations
currently imposed on intellectual property holders are insufficient to
achieve an appropriate balance of interests in information. In particular,
the obligations currently imposed on intellectual property holders,
generally, relate to the protection and enhancement of the public domain
of information and ideas as a whole rather than to protecting specific
competing private interests in valuable information. Thus, the obligations
currently imposed on intellectual property owners are very important in the
sense of an overall public-interest balance of information, but may do little
to protect specific individuals with competing interests in relevant
intellectual property, particularly those with limited means to assert or
enforce their interests.
The idea of balancing competing interests in information is not new,
but the framework presented in this Article for doing so provides a new
way of conceptualizing relevant issues that might ultimately benefit
benefit of tenants and duties of landholders not to waste premises for the benefit of remaindermen.
See infra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
76. See 3 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7.01 (1997) (stating that adequate
disclosure requirements imposed on a patent applicant ensure a sufficient quid pro quo for the
public in respect to the limited monopoly granted to the inventor).
77. Id (explaining that full disclosure also ensures that the relevant information will be
available to the public once the statutory monopoly period expires); l id. § I (providing that patent
holder can only assert patent during the statutory protection period).
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society in two ways. First, it will create more powerful legal rights in those
who seek to assert competing interests against an information property
holder based on legal duties owed by the property holder to those
competing interest holders. Second, it will provide a unified framework for
balancing competing interests in information under a simple, basic
doctrine, regardless of the specific nature of the information product in
question. Such a framework can apply broadly across the matrix of laws
relating to information property law both within the United States,7" and
ultimately, globally.79 An important aspect of this framework is the way
in which it addresses the question of who should bear the legal and
financial burdens of balancing information property rights against other
competing interests in relevant information.
I argue that those burdens should be predominantly borne by the right
holders themselves as legal duties attached to the privilege of property
ownership. I further argue that the state has a responsibility to monitor and
control the performance of such duties, particularly where the state itself
has supported the creation and commercial exploitation of the relevant
property rights.
In making these suggestions, I am sympathetic to the notion that we
must be careful about imposing additional obligations on property owners
in respect to competing interests in information. The reason for the
existence of laws supporting the creation of many information property
rights is to provide incentives to innovate."0 The grant of an information
property right is typically a reward for innovation."'
However, in the absence of definitive empirical evidence, it would
appear from anecdotal commentary that the balance of competing rights
in information currently tips too heavily in favor of information property
holders, often to the detriment of those with competing interests in
relevant information. I am assuming this to be the case. In any event, the
framework I am suggesting for balancing competing interests in
information should provide the flexibility to adapt to changing situations
in terms ofpromoting innovation versus preventing monopolistic practices
to the detriment of others with competing interests in relevant information.
As noted above, my suggested framework does not specifically address
the public domain question, although this is an important issue that is
currently being examined in the context of the initial grant and scope of
78. Such as copyright law, 17 U.S.C. (2000), patent law, 35 id., trademark law, 15 id. § 22,
and contractual information licensing law. UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTION ACT § 104
(amended 2001), available at http://www.ucitaonline.com/ucita.html.
79. See, e.g., Directive on the Protection of Databases, supra note 5.
80. See Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75
TEX. L. REV. 989, 993-94 (1997) (describing the incentive-for-innovation theory of copyright and
patent law).
81. Id.
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information property rights. 2 I see the public domain question as distinct
from, but related to, the issue of balancing competing individual interests
in proprietary information as the following discussion demonstrates.
Part II explains why current approaches to balancing information
property rights against competing interests in information have failed to
strike an effective balance to date. Part III describes a methodology for
balancing private rights against legal duties inherent in information
ownership, drawing on theories of traditional Property ownership as a
preferable framework for balancing competing interests in information.
Part IV examines the appropriate role for governments in monitoring and
enforcing any new legal duties imposed on information property owners.
Part V sets out some conclusions on these issues and summarizes the new
framework proposed for information property rights and responsibilities.
II. EXISTING LIMITATIONS ON INFORMATION PROPERTY RIGHTS

The current approaches most often identified as mechanisms for
limiting or restricting the exploitation of information property rights can
be divided into two categories. The first category might be described
generally as fair use. It encompasses laws that place restrictions on the
unfettered exercise of information property rights through the creation of
defenses to infringement actions in respect of those rights. The obvious
example is the fair use defense to copyright infringement in copyright
law. 3 A similar defense is found in relation to the infringement of a sui
generis database right in the European Union."
The second category of limitation on information property rights might
be described as involving limitations on the scope of the rights,
particularly in terms of duration." Debates about both the appropriate
duration of property rights in databases 6 and the duration of copyright law

82. See generally Symposium, supra note 14.
83. See 17 U.S.C. § 107; Copyright Act, 1968, §§ 40-42 (Austl.) ("fair dealing" defenses to
copyright infringement); Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48, §§ 29-30 (Eng.) ("fair
dealing" defenses to copyright infringement).
84. See Directive on the Protection of Databases, supra note 5, art. 6; see also Collections
of Information Antipiracy Bill, H.R. 354, 106th Cong. § 1403 (1999); Consumer and Investor
Access to Information Bill of 1999, H.R. 1858, 106th Cong. § 103 (1999). Database and
Collections of Information Misappropriation Bill, HR'. 3261, 108th Cong. § 4(b) (2003).
85. See Hettinger, supra note 1, at 51.
86. See Wesley L. Austin, A Thoughtful and Practical Analysis of Database Protection
Under Copyright Law, and a Critique ofSui Generis Protection, 3 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 3, 86
(I 997),.available at http://journal.law.ufl.edu/-techlaw/3-1 austin.htm (last visited Jan. 16,2001);
Jeffrey C. Wolken, Note, Just the Facts, Ma 'am. A Case for Uniform Federal Regulation of
Information Databases in the New Information Age, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1263, 1301 (1998).
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in the United States 7 evidence the way in which scholars and legislatures
have grappled with this issue.
Duration is not the only element of the scope of a property right in an
information product that may be limited in some way. Registered
trademarks, for example, are limited to one or more particular markets for
identified goods or services.88 Copyright protection is limited to fixed
expressions of original works, rather than abstract ideas. 89 Patent
protection is limited to novel and non-obvious inventions.9"
The two approaches described above to limiting information property
rights are not mutually exclusive. A particular information property right
might be limited both in terms of its scope, and, at the same time, it might
be subject to fair use defenses in an infringement action. 91. Thus, based on
the existing literature, one might assume that the best system that could be
developed for balancing rights in information would be a combination of
these approaches.
In contrast to the first approach involving fair use limitations, the
second approach with limitations on scope focuses more on public
interests and the protection of the public domain of information and
ideas. 92 Many of the limitations on the scope of information property are
aimed at ensuring that an information property holder does not take or
maintain more information property than is necessary to provide the
incentive to create. The first approach is more relevant to what we are

87. This debate flared again recently with new copyright term extension legislation. Sonny
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). A challenge to the validity of this legislation was
argued before the Supreme Court in October 2002. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). Court
documents and news items related to the litigation are available at http://eldred.cc/legal/
supremecourt.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2003).
88. When filing an application for a trademark, the applicant must identify the goods or

services for which registration is sought.

UNITED STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, BASIC

available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/officestac/doc/basic/
appcontent.htm#goods (last visited May 31, 2003). Some guidance in terms of the classifications
of goods and services can be obtained from the International Schedule of Classes of Goods and
Services, although this list is not exhaustive. See id., available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/tac/doc/basic/intemational.htm (last visited May 31, 2003).
89. 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03[D] (1978) (stating that a
copyright can only be claimed in a fixed expression and not an idea); id. § 2.03[B] (observing that
copyright work must be fixed in tangible form); id. § 2.01 (discussing the originality requirement
for copyright protection).
90. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2000). These requirements are distinct from the initial
requirements of a patentable subject matter. Id. § 101; CHISUM, supra note 76, § 1.01.
91. Copyrights, for example, are both limited in statutory terms and subject to fair use
defenses. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (fair use); id. §§ 301-305 (duration).
92. Symposium, supra note 14 (providing detailed commentary on different conceptions of
the public domain).

FACTS
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discussing here: the idea of balancing competing private interests in
information products.
I argue that there is a better way of balancing competing interests in
information than is inherent in the current fair use mechanism. I also
examine how the limitations on the scope of information property rights
are not of much help to those individuals and groups seeking to assert
competing interests in information products. The inherent difficulties in
relying on the current matrix of limitations on information property rights
to effectively protect competing interests in information are considered in
the next Part.
A. FairUse
1. Legislative Models
The most obvious model of a fair use defense involving an information
property right derives from copyright law. This is where the fair use
concept originated, although the model has now been utilized in other
contexts.93 The idea of fair use in the copyright context is that where a
person has used a copyrighted work in a manner that would otherwise
amount to copyright infringement, a defense will be available in certain
circumstances. The fair use defense in United States copyright law appears
in title 17 of the United States Code.
Section 107 of title 17 contemplates that certain uses of a copyrighted
work, which would otherwise infringe the copyright, are defensible in
particular circumstances. The purposes contemplated in the fair use section
include "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research."94 Section 107 also sets
out four factors that a court shall consider when determining whether a
particular use amounts to a fair use of a copyrighted work:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether
the use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit
educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and, (4) the

93. This strategy has been utilized in various models ofsui generis database protection law
both in the United States and the European Union, but is not the most effective manner for
balancing private rights and public interests in such information assets. Jacqueline Lipton,
Balancing Private Rights and Public Policies: Reconceptualizing Property in Databases, 18
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming 2003).

94. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
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effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.9
Obviously, the idea behind the fair use doctrine is to place some
limitations on the rights of a copyright holder where society generally, and
some individuals or groups in particular,96 would benefit from restricting
the exercise of these rights.
This fair use model for balancing private rights in an information
product against competing interests in relevant information has also been
adopted in the E.U. Database Directive (through the sui generis database
right).97 This right is distinct from copyright. It is a property right in a
database, including a non-original database, based on the effort put into
compiling the database.9"
As copyrights and database rights are different legal constructions,
there was no inevitability that fair use provisions would be included in
database law. The drafters of the E.U. Database Directive obviously chose
to adapt the fair use model for database law as one type of limitation on
database rights.9 9 Also included were limitations on the duration of
database rights as an additional measure to prevent over-commodification
of such information assets.1" ° However, neither measure has proved
particularly effective in practice as a meaningful limitation on a database
right.'0 ' The problems with the limitations on duration are addressed in
Part III.B.
In terms of fair use, article 6(2) of the Directive provides that Member
States implementing the Directive "have the option of providing for
limitations on the [database right]" in four circumstances:
(a) in the case of reproduction for private purposes of a nonelectronic database; (b) where there is use for the sole
purpose of illustration for teaching or scientific research, as

95. 17 U.S.C. §§ 107(1)-(4).
96. For example, scientists and educators.
97. Directive on the Protection of Databases, supra note 5, art. 6.
98. Id. art. 7. In fact, the substantial effort test described is basically derived from the "sweat
of the brow" doctrine rejected in the Feistcase in the copyright context. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural
Tel. Serv. Co. 499 U.S. 340, 359-60 (1991).
99. For a more detailed discussion of this issue in the database context, see Lipton, supranote
93.
100. Directive on the Protection of Databases, supra note 5, art. 10.
101. The reasons for this are explained later in this Part. Basically, fair use has been ineffective
in this context because the fair use provisions in the Database Directive are optional and are only
implemented at the discretion of each European Union Member State. Id. art. 6. The fifteen-year
duration can be extended indefinitely if a database is continually updated, as is the case with most
online databases. Id. art. 10(3); see also LLOYD, supra note 62, at 189-90; Davison, supra note 63,
at 283.
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long as the source is indicated and to the extent justified by
the non-commercial purpose to be achieved; (c) where there
is use for the purposes of public security o[r] for the purposes
of an administrative or judicial procedure; (d) where other
exceptions to copyright which are traditionally authorized
under national law are involved .... '0'
In this model, we see a reflection of the attitudes underlying the U.S.
fair use defense. The public policy is to preserve specific uses of database
contents that do not create unfair commercial competition with the
database rights holder and which promote particular public interests like
education, research, and public security. However, these public purposes
are given lesser weight in the E.U. Database Directive than in the context
of United States copyright law.
For one thing, the fair use exceptions to a database right only come into
being in the domestic law of E.U. Member States at the option of each
state's government.1 3 Thus, they are not implemented uniformly across all
E.U. countries. E.U. Member States are not obliged to implement any
particular fair use exception into domestic law."° The United Kingdom,
for example, has only adopted a fair use exception relating to "illustration
for teaching or research and not for any commercial purpose."'0 5 The
domestic legislation in the United Kingdom further provides that to assert
this defense, the user must be "a lawful user of the database, ' 1O6 and that
the database must have been made available to the public. 0 7 This
exemplifies the way in which an E.U. Member State can further limit the
operation of the fair use defense contemplated in article 6(2) of the
Database Directive, if indeed its legislature chooses to adopt the defense
at all.
2. Fair Use in the Digital Age
Fair use can be effective in certain contexts. Historically, it was
generally effective in copyright law. However, it is becoming increasingly
problematic in the global information age for a variety of reasons. Some
of the more obvious problems revolve around the uncertain legal and

102. Directive on the Protection of Databases, supra note 5, arts. 6(2)(a)-(d).
103. Id. art. 6(2).
104. Id.
105. Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations, 1997, c. 20(1)(b), § 3032 (Eng.); see also
id. sched. 1 (providing exceptions for various government purposes, but not augmenting the
exceptions for private fair uses).
106. Id. reg. 20(l)(a).
107. Id. reg. 20(1). The exception also requires the source of the database to be indicated by
the person arguing "fair dealing," the English term for fair use. Id. reg. 20(1)(c).
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constitutional status of the defense and its vagueness of application. In
copyright law, it has never been clear in theory or practice whether the fair
use defense creates a constitutionally protected right to use a copyrighted
work for certain purposes, or rather, is a tolerated convenience in cases
where it would not be cost effective for a copyright holder to bring an
infringement action against a specific user.'08 If information property right
holders convince courts and legislatures that the latter view should prevail,
it tips the balance in favor of the holders of those rights.
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that copyright holders, in the
digital information age, can utilize encryption technologies on copyrighted
works to prevent unauthorized access and copying0 9 and to more easily
track down those who make unauthorized copies of digital works."0 At
least in the physical world, it was easier as a matter of practice to make an
unauthorized copy of a copyrighted work without being caught,
particularly if using the copy did not harm the economic position of the
copyright holder.
However, in the digital world, copyright holders are more likely to be
in a position to locate and act against unauthorized users of copyrighted
works. Thus, requiring such users to bear the legal and financial burdens
of establishing their rights, in the absence of any consensus on the nature
or constitutional strength of the rights, is likely to put those users in a
difficult position. Many such potential users might be persuaded that the
safest course of action is to avoid making any unauthorized uses of a
relevant work rather than using the work and then having to argue fair use.

108. Compare W.R. CORNISH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE
MARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS (4th ed. 1999) (stating that fair dealing rights in English copyright law

have the status of constitutionally guaranteed rights to access and use a copyright work), andEldred
v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (suggesting that the fair use doctrine might be derived from a
constitutional guarantee of free speech in much the same way that the idea-expression dichotomy
in copyright law has developed to protect free speech and that fair use strikes a balance between
First Amendment free speech concerns and copyright law), with Nimmer, supra note 25, at 714-15
(questioning this proposition).
109. Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEYTECH. L.J. 575, 580 (2003) [hereinafter
Cohen, DRMandPrivacy];Julie E. Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace: The New Economic Orthodoxy
of "Rights Management," 97 MICH. L. REV. 462, 471 (1998) [hereinafter Cohen, Lochner in
Cyberspace] (arguing that these digital technologies create market failures in the digital economy);
FRED VON LOHMANN, ELEC. FRONTIER FUND, FAIR USE AND DIGITAL RIGHTS MANAGEMENT:
PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON THE (IRRECONCILABLE?) TENSION BETWEEN THEM (2002), at

http://www.eff.org/IP/DRM/fair-use-and-drm.html (last visited June 6, 2003).
110. See Ingemar J. Cox & Matt L. Miller, The First 50 Years of Electronic Watermarking,
2 EURASIP J. APPLIED SIGNAL PROCESSING 126-32 (2002), at http://asp.hindawi.com/volume2002/S I110865702000525.html (last visited June 9, 2003); Alex Simeonides, Protecting Your
Online Assets, WEBSERVER ONLINE, at http://webserver.cpg.com/features/f3/2.7/ (last visited June
13, 2003); Edward J. Delp, Watermarking: Who Cares? Does it Work?, Proceedings of the
Workshop on Multimedia and Security at ACM Multimedia '98, Bristol, UK (Sept. 12-14, 1998).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol56/iss1/2

22

Liptone: Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities

INFORMATION PROPERTY

The lack of consensus about the constitutional basis of the defense goes
hand-in-hand with the vagueness of the defense in general. The defense as
incorporated in § 107 of title 17 is only intended as a general guide for
courts when determining fair use issues. The list of fair use purposes in
§ 107 is not intended to be exhaustive,"' and there is no instruction on2
how courts should weigh any of the four factors in a given case."
Although this vagueness gives the defense a certain flexibility of
operation, it does sacrifice certainty.
People wanting to raise a fair use defense to digital copyrights are often
put in an untenable position if they Want to pursue their perceived rights
to make unauthorized use of a digital copyright work. First, they have to
deal with the potential access problems" 3 if the work is digitally
encrypted." 4 Then, they have to cope with the greater likelihood of being
caught by the copyright holder and having an action brought against them,
or at least being threatened with legal action." 5 Finally, their choice will
be either to stop using the work altogether for fear of litigation or to
litigate and bear the legal and financial burdens of convincing a court of
their right to use the work in question. This creates an inappropriate
balance of interests in the copyrighted work. Often, the person whose use
should be protected will back away from using the information because of
a lack of bargaining power outside the courtroom or a lack of financial
resources for litigation.
Although many of these problems existed in the pre-digital world, they
did not exist on the same scale because copyright holders did not have
such sophisticated technical means of controlling access to their works." 6

111. See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Univeral City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450 n.31 (1984);
BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE

NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 75 (1995), available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/

com/doc/ipnii/ (last visited Nov. 22, 2003).
112. See LEHMAN, supranote 11, at 83-84 nn.263-64. Although Congress provided some fair
use guidelines for libraries and educational institutions for educational uses of copyright materials,
none of the four sets of guidelines were ever enacted into legislation. Id.Existing guidelines, which
are part of legislative history, discuss copying by and for teachers in the classroom context, the
copying of music for educational uses, inter-library copying of recent journal articles, and off-air
videotaping of educational broadcast materials. Id.
113. Under the DMCA, access to a copyrighted work is illegal even if the use for which access
is sought is a fair use. See Nimmer, supra note 25, at 723. But see Samuelson, supra note 25, at
539-40
114. See LOHMANN, supra note 109 (discussing the use of digital rights management to
prevent access to or copying of digital works).
115. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
116. See generally C.J. Alice Chen & Aaron Burstein, ForewardtoSymposium, The Law &
Technology of DigitalRights Management, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 487 (2003) (providing an
overview of digital rights management); Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace, supra note 109.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 2
FLORIDA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 56

Additionally, they only existed in the copyright world, and not in relation
to other valuable information products. Now, as more laws are being
drafted to protect proprietary and quasi-proprietary rights in digital
information products'17 and many legislatures are attracted to the fair use
model for protecting public interests in information,"' these problems are
likely to be multiplied." 9
Another related problem with over-reliance on a fair use defense as a
means of creating an appropriate balance of competing interests in
valuable information products involves the increasing irrelevance of
measures based on use if the owner of an information property right is
effectively able to prevent unauthorized access. In the modem
technological world, owners of such rights increasingly utilize
technological protection measures, 20 often bolstered by restrictive
contractual licenses,'
and sometimes legislation, 122 to prevent
unauthorized access per se. A person wishing to make a legitimate use of
the work may not be able to obtain access, thus effectively preventing an
otherwise permissible use.
This problem has clearly manifested itself in the context of digital
copyrighted works, particularly in the wake of the enactment of the
DMCA.'23 Even without this legislation, if right holders can effectively
prevent access to an information product through technological and
contractual measures, 24 the debate about fair use becomes irrelevant
unless fair use takes on the status of a constitutionally protected right. If
it is regarded as a protected right, courts may ultimately be compelled to
issue orders that strike down technological protection measures and
restrictive contractual provisions to the extent that they infringe on a
person's ability to exercise such a right.

117. E.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (2000) (creating rights in semiconductor chips); Directive on
the Protection of Databases, supranote 5.
118. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
119. See generally Lipton, supra note 93 (examining the inappropriateness of utilizing a
copyright model for protecting proprietary interests in databases).
120. See Cohen, DRM and Privacy, supra note 109; Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace, supra
note 109, at 470-71 (noting that DRM creates market failures in the digital economy); Fisher, supra
note 6, at 1209-10.
121. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996); Fisher, supra note
6, at 1211; Madison, supra note 6, at 1052-53.
122. E.g., Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); Directive on Copyright, supra note 58,
art. 6. Both of these laws support technological encryption measures utilized by copyright holders
to prevent unauthorized access to copyrighted works. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a); Directive on Copyright,
supra note 58, art. 6.
123. Samuelson, supranote 25, at 519 (discussing the overbroad reach of anti-access and antidevice provisions in the DMCA).
124. See generally Fisher, supra note 6.
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However, the constitutional status of the fair use defense in copyright
law remains uncertain. 25 The potential status of the defense in other areas26
of information property rights law is equally, if not more, uncertain.1
While this is the case, reliance on fair use defenses to achieve an
appropriate balance of interests in information products is futile. Where
potential fair users cannot access an information product, the legal
protection of their right to use it is irrelevant.
In the copyright context, some of these issues could be resolved by
amendments to title 17. The legal status of fair use and the scope of the fair
use defense might be clarified for the digital age if Congress amends the
DMCA so that copyright holders are not permitted to deny access to fair
users.' This would certainly be a good place to start and mayprovide a
copyright-specific example of how to approach the broader problem of
finding an optimal balance for competing interests in information property
more generally.
However, the problem of balancing competing interests in valuable
information is greater than problems of access to, and use of, copyrighted
works. Thus, examining the solution to some of the bigger problems of
information ownership through a copyright lens may ultimately prove less
effective than considering the problems more generically. If we can
formulate some broad information property principles relating to balancing
competing interests in information, then we can apply them to property
rights in other types of valuable information-non-original databases and
patents, for example.
The specific copyright application of the broad principles may look
something like that described above: expanding and clarifying the
operation of the fair use defense to copyright infringement, and building
clear fair use exceptions into the DMCA's access prohibitions.'28
However, those developments could be informed by a broader underlying
policy that balances interests in information more generally. This general
policy could ultimately lead to greater harmonization of laws relating to
information property in terms of their underlying public policy
considerations. It might, therefore, increase certainty and predictably in
disputes involving many kinds of information property rights.

125. See Nimmer, supra note 25, at 714-15.
126. For example, in the trademark area, see Michael G. Frey, Is it Fairto Confuse? An
Examination of TrademarkProtection,the FairUse Defense, andthe FirstAmendment,65 U. CIN.
L. REV. 1255, 1287-89 (1997).
127. In fact, this may well have been Congress' intention in the first place. 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201 (c)(1) (stating that fair use rights are not to be affected by the enactment of the DMCA). This
provision suggests that Congress may not have realized the potential impact of the DMCA on fair
use.

128. Id. §§ 1201(a)(l)(A), (a)(2), (b)(1).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

25

Florida Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 2

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

3. Fair Use Purposes
Another problem with relying predominantly on fair use-type defenses
as a balancing tool for rights in information is the fact that the fair use
defense is derived from copyright law (as noted above), and thus tends to
reflect copyright policy even when translated into other contexts. While
fair use in the copyright context has historically been concerned with
educational, research, and news-reporting uses,'2 9 many other potential
uses of, and interests in, information products are becoming increasingly
important in the digital information age. Thus, maintaining the copyright
fair use policy balance in relation to all information products more
generally will potentially create an overly narrow focus on interests
that
30
may compete with those of the information property owner.
People are becoming more concerned about their privacy in the global
information age.' 3 ' The traditional fair use model from copyright law has
nothing to say about protecting personal privacy interests in relation to
information that may be incorporated into an information asset, like a
database of consumer spending profiles. This model also has nothing to
say about protecting cultural interests that may inhere in elements of an
information asset. As mentioned earlier, a copyright work may be derived
from music, words, or artistic traditions from a particular group of people
that ultimately becomes powerless to protect its spiritual, cultural, or
financial interests once the work has been copyrighted. 132 Further, the
traditional fair use model does not protect moral rights of an author in a
particular work, although those are protected as separate rights, to a greater
or lesser extent, 33 under many copyright schemes.
We should therefore avoid larger-scale adoptions of fair use defenses
within the broader information law and policy context' because of their

129. Id. § 107.
130. See Lipton, supra note 93 (discussing this issue in relation to the problems with
translating copyright fair use principles to sui generis database rights).
131. This is probably because digital technologies allow grander scale incursions on personal
information than ever before possible. Ann Bartow, Our Data,Ourselves: Privacy,Propertization,
andGender, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 633, 634 (2000) (stating that cyberspace is a "fertile ground for the
harvesting of consumer data" and there is little that can be done to preserve personal privacy).
132. See generally COOMBE, supra note 12; Chander, supra note 1; Stephenson, supra note
12.
133. The extent of the protection varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction; for example, the
Visual Artists Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990), in the United States protects
moral rights only in certain classes of visual works. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2000).
134. See generally Ku ET AL., supra note 47, at 15 (2002) (suggesting that there is a
developing law and policy of information per se); RAYMOND T. NIMMER, INFORMATION LAW xii
(1996) (same); Jacqueline Lipton, A Frameworkfor Information Law and Policy, 81 OR. L. REV.

(forthcoming 2004).
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specificity to the copyright context and because of questions about access
and use by a competing interest holder, as opposed to attempts by such an
interest holder to prevent particular uses of information by an information
property holder. Laws emulating this copyright model will tend to adopt
only those fair use provisions historically provided in the copyright
context, limited to the types of purposes and uses contemplated in
copyright law.'35 Although this approach may be suitable for traditional
copyrighted works, it is less likely to meet the needs of society in relation
136
to more generic information products like valuable online databases.
The other limitation of adapting a more generic copyright model to
balance competing interests in information products is that fair use has
traditionally been applied in very specific contexts. It was never intended
to provide a comprehensive balance of interests in copyrighted works, to
say nothing of other information products. It has only been part of the
picture in limiting a right holder's ability to exploit his or her private rights
in a copyrighted work. Limiting the duration of the copyright term, 37
limiting copyright to cover expressions and not ideas,138 the first sale
doctrine, 39 and the recognition of moral rights, 4 ' are other examples of
attempts to balance competing interests in copyrighted works.
This does not mean that fair use cannot maintain its position as a useful
part of a strategy to balance competing interests in information products.
It has always served this function in the past in relation to copyrighted
works. However, I would caution against over-reliance on it as the answer
to all the problems posed by digital information technology. Without
necessarily rejecting fairuse for the digital information age, we need to
think more expansively about the kinds of interests that need to be
balanced against private property rights in information. In so doing, we

135. For example, the fair use provisions in the E.U. Database Directive mirror copyright
principles, with the addition of a "public security" provision. Directive on the Protection of
Databases, supra note 5, art. 6. Privacy rights are not included as part of these provisions, although
they are provided for under the E.U. Data Protection Directive. Council Directive 95/46/EEC, art.
1, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Directive on Data Protection]. Attempts to draft a database
protection bill for the United States have also evidenced a limitation of fair use provisions to the
kinds contemplated in copyright law. See Lipton, supranote 93.
136. Lipton, supra note 93.
137. 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-305.
138. 1 NIMMER, supra note 89, § 2.03[D] (stating that a copyright can only be claimed in a
fixed expression and not an idea).
139. The first sale doctrine prevents the copyright owner from controlling subsequent transfers
of the copies of a copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). The doctrine limits only the copyright
owner's distribution rights, not his or her reproduction rights in the copyrighted work. LEHMAN,
supra note I 1, at 90-92; see also T.B. Harms Co. v. Jem Records, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1575, 1582
(D.N.J. 1987); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 612 F. Supp. 315. 319 (M.D. Pa.
1985), aff'd, 800 F.2d 59 (3d Cir. 1986).
140. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A.
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need to identify effective ways of approaching the problem on a more
global scale than has been the case in the past.
B. Limitations on PropertyScope
Historically, the second mechanism for balancing competing interests
in information products has been to limit the scope of the relevant rights
in one or more ways. Limitations on the scope of private rights in
information often relate to the duration of the relevant right(s). Patents are
generally limited to a twenty year duration.' 4 1 Copyrights are limited to the
author's life plus seventy years. 42 In contrast, registered trademark rights
can last indefinitely provided that they are renewed in conformity with the
relevant legislation. 143 Trade secrets can also last indefinitely while their
secrecy is maintained. 44
Unlike fair use, these limitations on information property are imposed
for the benefit of society as a whole, rather than for the benefit of specific
individuals or groups asserting competing interests in relevant property.
The common theme is that both fair use limitations and limitations on the
scope of property rights are imposed in an attempt to achieve an
appropriate overall societal balance of rights in valuable information.
Apart from duration, there are other ways in which the scope of
property rights in valuable information products has been limited in the
past. Copyright, for example, protects fixed original expressions of ideas,
but does not extend to the protection of abstract ideas. 145 Applicants for
trademark registration are required to identify the goods or services for
which the mark will be
used.'46 Patents are only granted for novel and non47
1
obvious inventions.
Commentators on the creation ofsui generisproperty rights in valuable
electronic databases have often talked about drafting appropriate
14
limitations on the scope of the property rights, notably the duration. 1
141. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (codifying patent term, which is generally twenty years from the
date of filing the patent application).
142. In mostjurisdictions, copyright lasts for the author's life plus seventy years. Fisher, supra
note 6, at 1233; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (discussing the recent extensions
of the copyright term).
143. Trademark registration under the federal register in the United States generally lasts for
ten years. 15 U.S.C. § 1058(a). Registrants can apply for successive ten-year renewal periods for
their registered mark(s). 15 id. § 1059(a).
144. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETrION § 39 cmt. b (1995) (stating that
trade secrets are defined by secrecy and economic value); LEHMAN, supra note 111, at 174.
145. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
147. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103.
148. It has been suggested in the database context that a three- or four-year term of protection
for the relevant information property rights may be more appropriate than the original models that
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Unfortunately, attempts to limit the time period to less than that provided
for copyrights have backfired, potentially creating an indefinite right in the
case of continually updated databases. Despite the fifteen-year duration of
a database right set out in the E.U. Database Directive,'49 the provision for
a new fifteen-year term of protection for an updated database' creates the
potential for a database right to last forever. 5 ' Most electronic databases
will be updated sufficiently often to attract constantly renewed terms of
protection, thus effectively granting them indefinite protection." 2
Limiting the scope of property rights in information products is
obviously one way of ensuring some kind of overall societal balance to
interests in relevant information. The effectiveness of this approach will
depend on the circumstances in which it is employed and the way in which
limitations are drafted, as the E.U. Database Directive example illustrates.
The main disadvantage with relying on restricting the scope of
information products as a means of ensuring a balance between competing
interests in information is that this mechanism is not specifically tailored
to the precise interests that may be implicated by a particular property
right. Nevertheless, limiting the scope of a private property right will
generally have some overall
positive effects on the public domain of
153
information and ideas.

If a patentee can only assert a patent for twenty years, society as a
whole will presumably benefit from the development of the invention,5 4
its publication on the patent register, and, ultimately, its release into the
public domain. (This is, of course, assuming that the incentive of a patent
grant was required to develop the invention in the first place, 55 and that
the twenty-year time period is appropriate.'56 ). However, this scheme does

ranged between fifteen- and twenty-five year terms. Austin, supra note 86, 86; Wolken, supra
note 86, at 1301.
149. Directive on the Protection of Databases, supra note 5, arts. 10(1), 10(2).
150. Id. art. 10(3).
151. LLOYD, supra note 62, at 189-90.
152. Id.
153. See Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 1,at 1559 (commenting on the idea of a public
domain of information); see also supra note 18 and accompanying text. See generally Malla
Pollack, The Owned PublicDomain: The ConstitutionalRight not to be Excluded-Or the Supreme
Court Chose the Right Breakfast Cereal in Kellogg v. National Biscuit Co., 22 HASTINGS Comm.
& ENT. L.J. 265 (2000) (discussing the nature of the public domain).
154. It is assumed that society will ultimately benefit from patents. See supra note 76 and
accompanying text.
155. In the software patenting context, see Swinson, supra note 41, at 212-14 (commenting
that software is more appropriately protected by copyright than by patent). But see Cohen &
Lemley, supra note 41, at 5 (noting the advantages of patenting software).
156. Swinson, supra note 41, at 157-59 (arguing that the current patent term is not in keeping
with the way software innovation develops, suggesting at least one case where patent is not
appropriate for a specific kind of invention).
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nothing to ensure that those who should have the ability to utilize the
invention prior.to the expiration of the patent period on public policy
grounds may do so, at least in the absence of a compulsory licensing
scheme.' 57
Additionally, limiting the scope of an information property rightperse
does not require the right holder to take any positive steps to fulfill specific
duties in respect to relevant rights. In other words, no significant
affirmative public duties are imposed on the right holders, other than the
duty to disclose their invention on the patent register."' There may be
implied negative duties-for instance, the duty not to continue to assert a
particular right after its duration has expired, and not to assert a right
outside its expressed boundaries.
In any event, with encryption technologies supported by restrictive
contractual measures, much of what is copyrighted, and some of what is
currently patented, can be effectively commodified and monopolized
outside of the copyright and patent systems, regardless of statutory
limitations placed on the scope of standard copyrights and patents.'59 In the
absence of affirmative duties on information property holders to facilitate
certain competing interests in their property, regardless of the contractual
and technological fences they may have constructed, the standard
limitations in intellectual property scope become increasingly irrelevant.
As with fair use, one of the greatest problems with relying on limiting
the scope of private property rights in information is the fact that contract
and technological measures can effectively increase the scope of a
property right, or even create new property rights, 60 unless expressly
prohibited or restricted by law. 6 ' Where right holders are able to use
contract and technology in this way, and in the absence of affirmative
duties to limit their use of these mechanisms in certain contexts, neither
fair use defenses nor limiting the scope of property rights will be
particularly effective in protecting competing interests in relevant
information.

157. There is a compulsory licensing scheme for patents in England. Patents Act, 1977, c. 37,
§ 48 (Eng.).
158. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
159. See generally Cohen, DRM and Privacy, supra note 109; Fisher, supra note 6; Madison,
supra note 6.
160. For example, databases that are insufficiently original to attract copyright protection in
the United States may effectively be propertized through contract and technological measures. See,
e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
161. To date, the legal institutions in a number ofjurisdictions have, in fact, supported, rather
than monitored and controlled, new information property rights. E.g., Digital Millennium Copyright
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17
U.S.C.); Directive on Copyright, supra note 58; UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT, supra
note 78.
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Another way of looking at it is to say that while fair use defenses and
statutory limitations on the scope of property rights are useful ways of
preserving competing interests in information and protecting the public
domain to some extent, their major disadvantage is that they do not impose
any significant affirmative duties on the right holder. The onus of
establishing that a particular use should be permitted as a fair use, or of
proving that a particular right holder is asserting rights beyond the scope
granted by the State, will not fall on the right holder. Instead, it will be up
to the party attempting to access or use, or to restrict the property holder's
use of, a particular information product to convince a court of these things.
Such a party may not have the time, resources, or inclination to take
relevant action.
It makes more sense to charge the right holders themselves with
affirmative duties to protect competing interests in information and ideas
as a condition of their information property ownership. As an additional
safeguard, a government that grants and supports the creation of
information property rights should be charged with the responsibility of
monitoring and enforcing the duties owed by right holders to other
members of society.
III.

RECONCEPTUALIZING THE ISSUES

A. PropertyRights and Responsibilities
The idea of imposing affirmative legal duties on property holders is not
new, although often we fail to conceive of property ownership as involving
legal responsibility. We have already identified some affirmative duties
attaching to intellectual property ownership, and many such duties are
apparent in traditional Property law and theory.'6 2 Property rights in the
past have never been absolute,'63 and there is no reason why information
property rights should be any different. If information property rights are
here to stay, we should consider ways in which responsibilities of property
ownership can be developed and imposed on right holders as part of our
legal system.
We need to start thinking about an overarching policy framework for
information property rights that incorporates concurrent legal duties. These
duties may take different forms in relation to different information assets

162. These include the duty of a landlord to maintain premises in good repair for the benefit
of tenants, the duty of a Property holder not to waste Property to preserve the interests of
remaindermen, duties imposed under restrictive covenants, and easements which restrict uses land
holders may make of their Property that would interfere with access or other interests of other
members of society. See infra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
163. See Chander, supra note 1, at 778.
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and may overlap with existing doctrines, like fair use in copyright law, but
they will not always operate on the same basis. The hope is that these
duties would go some way towards achieving a more appropriate balance
of competing interests in valuable information.
Under this model, for example, instead of placing an onus on private
individuals to bear the costs of asserting an often ill-defined fair use
defense to an alleged copyright infringement, it would become a duty
attaching to copyright ownership that the right holder ensures that certain
uses of the copyrighted work are facilitated. These uses would need to be
identified in relevant legislation more clearly than the current fair use
provisions in copyright law. Legislation would also need to be crafted to
override the operation of legislative provisions 164 and contractual and
technological measures 161 that restrict access to the information property
in question. This legislation would impose duties attaching to property
ownership that would be enforceable at the behest of affected parties as
strenuously as the property rights could be asserted by the right holders
against "bad faith"' 66 infringers. 167 These obligations might be extended to
include duties of information property holders generally to facilitate all
non-profit personal, 6 educational and scientific uses of their information
products regardless of what technological or contractual measures might
16 9
be in place to protect against unauthorized competitive market uses.

164. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
165. See generally ProCD, Inc., 86 F.3d at 1447; Fisher, supra note 6; Madison, supra note
6.
166. In this context, bad-faith infringers need to be distinguished at the policy level from
people who require access to and use of relevant proprietary information in the public interest. This
can be a difficult distinction, but a useful starting point is to focus on unfair commercial activities
that compete with the information property holder as the idea behind bad faith. Jacqueline Lipton,
Mixed Metaphors in Cyberspace: Propertyin Information/InformationSystems, 34 LOY. U. Cmi.
L.J. (forthcoming 2003).
167. Clearly to achieve these aims, significant thought would have to be put into distinguishing
between an actual copyright infringer and one who is entitled to access and use the copyrighted
work as a matter of public policy. An actual copyright infringer might be described in terms of the
person's intent to economically injure the copyright holder or in terms of the effect of that person's
conduct injuring the copyright holder. A bonafide user of copyright would presumably be defined
in terms of a person with an intention to only make personal, educational, or scientific uses of the
material in question with no intention to injure the copyright holder, or with little chance of an
injurious effect on the copyright holder resulting from his or her conduct. However, as the
following discussion demonstrates, the property obligations model would not end with the idea of
transforming fair use exceptions to copyright into a right holder's obligations. Thus, broader policy
issues will arise, rendering unimportant the need to delineate between a copyright infringer and a
fair user.
168. Moore, supra note 1,at 85 (suggesting that a legal rule that allows for all non-profit
personal uses of a intellectual work may be "what is needed to maximize overall social utility" in
the area of valuable information).
169. For a summary of the laws that prevent unauthorized or bad-faith competitive market uses
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This model would obviously require detailed debate to determine the
overall nature and scope of duties to be imposed on information property
owners. Presumably, some thought would also need to be given to the
actual implementation of those duties and the ability to re-work them
where they may be failing to strike an appropriate balance between
competing interests in information. Some of these issues are canvassed in
this Part.
Despite the fact that the above example draws from fair use in
copyright law, the information property model suggested in this Article
would not be limited to copyright law. The more fundamental idea
presented here is to create a model for all valuable information property
rights that balances those rights against various other interests in
information and ideas. These interests would likely include the kinds of
things generally conceptualized under the fair use defense to
copyright-scientific, educational, research, and private uses of
information products. However, it could also incorporate interests-like
privacy interests-to personal information, moral rights of authors to their
works, and cultural rights to information products derived from the works
or traditions of specific cultural groups.
Thus, as another example of how the model might operate in practice,
one could impose on information property right holders an obligation of
accuracy in any information maintained by the right holder in a proprietary
database. 7 ° Similarly, the information property right holder could be
required to give individuals access to their personal information in the
database or to require removal ofparticular information from a database.' 7 '
Crafting such provisions as duties attached to property ownership might
avoid arguments about the necessity to create strong property' 2 or

of proprietary information, see Lipton, supra note 166.
170. This suggestion is not implying any particular proprietary model for rights in databases;
the suggestions about creating obligations in a database to counterbalance relevant property rights
in the database could work under a copyright model of database protection such as that currently
found in Australia, Desktop Mktg. Sys. Party Ltd. v. Telstra Corp. Ltd. (2002) 192 A.L.R. 433, or
a suigenerismodel found in the E.U. Database Directive. Directive on the Protection of Databases,
supranote 5.
171. Models for such legislation can be found in some jurisdictions already, although not
described in terms of incidents of property ownership in the information assets. See, e.g., Privacy
Act, 1988, § 14 (Austl.).
172. See, e.g., Bartow, supra note 13 1, at 634 (advocating personal property rights in personal
information); Mark Lemley, Private Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1545, 1551 (2000) (considering
the possibility of property rights in personal information); Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as
Intellectual Property?,52 STAN. L. REv. 1125, 1130-46 (2000) (analyzing the advantages and
disadvantages of accepting property rights in personal information).
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personal privacy rights in personal data'73 under sui generis legislation;
this could all be taken care of as part of the legislation creating the relevant
property rights.
In a sense, this is what has been done in the European Union under the
E.U. Data Protection Directive.' 74 This Directive imposes significant
limitations on what a "controller'" of data may do with personal
information about individuals. There are clear limitations on unauthorized
uses and transfers of personal data imposed by the Directive on
controllers.'7 6 Controllers of personal data will often be organizations that
manage large databases, and that can assert sui generisproprietary rights
in their databases under the E.U. Database Directive. Thus, imposing
obligations on the controllers under the Data Protection Directive is an
effective counterbalance to the proprietary rights granted in the database.
This looks like an example of what I am suggesting in this Article,
although obviously in a much more limited context. Here, an obligation to
protect personal privacy of individuals is imposed on an information
property owner as a limitation on, and arguably as a condition of, its
otherwise relatively unfettered proprietary interest in a database. The Data
Protection Directive does not require private individuals to safeguard their
own personal privacy interests, but puts the legal and financial burdens on
the data controllers themselves to protect the personal privacy interests of
individuals.
In a sense, this regulatory scheme shows how government policy can
utilize information property rights and concurrent responsibilities to
achieve a desired balance between competing interests in information: the
database producer's proprietary interest in her compilation, on the one
hand, and the individual's interest in personal privacy in relation to
personal information contained within a proprietary database, on the other.
173. See generally e.g., Litman, supra note 33 (arguing against the need for property rights
in personal data and evaluating the basis for privacy rights in such data).
174. Directive on Data Protection, supra note 135.
175. The E.U. Directive defines "controller" as: "the natural or legal person, public authority,
agency or any other body which alone or jointly with others determines the purposes and means of
the processing of personal data." Id. art. 2(d).
176. Id. art. 6 (setting out basic principles of fairness and lawfulness in relation to processing
data, including a provision that data should only be collected for "specified, explicit, and
legitimate" uses). The E.U. Directive also includes a provision that data should be kept in a form
that does not identify data subjects for longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data
was collected. Id.art. 6(l)(e). The Directive also sets out a general prohibition on "the processing
of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical
beliefs, trade-union membership, and the processing of data concerning health or sex life," subject
to some limitations. Id. art. 8(1). Article 12 provides a right of access to data in relation to data
subjects. Id. art. 12. Article 25 provides a general prohibition of data transfers by a controller to
someone in a third country which does not ensure an adequate level of data protection. Id.art. 25.
Again, there are exceptions. Id.arts. 25-26.
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The burden is not on concerned individuals to convince a court that they
have a privacy right in relation to a database's contents. Rather, the legal
and financial burden is on the database producer to ensure adequate legal
protection of personal privacy.
Another example of the potential societal benefits of conceptualizing
information property in a way that incorporates legal duties or obligations
might be found in the context of moral rights. These rights have had a
greater impact to date in Europe than in the United States.' These are
rights attached to authors of works that promote and preserve the integrity
of the work in question (right of integrity),' 78 and the right of the author to
79
be identified as the creator of the work in question (right of attribution).
These rights of the author could be re-cast as obligationsof the copyright
holder, which would again put the onus on the property right holder to
protect the rights of the author as a duty attached to the ownership of the
property right. 8 ' In this context, some difficult policy choices would have
to be made in the international arena as to the necessity for these rights,
given that major trading jurisdictions have not, in the past, seen eye-to-eye
on the need to recognize moral rights.' 8 '
The same would be true of policy decisions about protecting cultural
rights attached to information products as part of a model incorporating
legal duties as an attribute of information property. Legislatures would
have to decide what kinds of cultural interests should be protected as a
duty attached to property ownership. There would also be a global
dimension here, as with many other duties that might attach to information
property ownership. Often cultural and moral rights, in particular, will
attach to people or groups who are in a different jurisdiction to the person
asserting a relevant information property right. This possibility is all the
more reason to consider these issues on a global scale where possible177. Susan P. Liemer, UnderstandingArtists'MoralRights: A Primer,7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
41,42 (1998); Marina Santilli, UnitedStates 'MoralRightsDevelopments in EuropeanPerspective,
I MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 89 (1997); Natalie C. Suhl, Moral Rights Protectionin the United
States Under the Berne Convention:A Fictional Work?, 12 FoRDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 1203, 1213-14 (2002).
178. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
180. The legal nature of moral rights has proved somewhat elusive in the past. It has been
unclear whether they are best regarded as personal rights of the author or artist, or as a species of
property rights in the hands of the author or artist. See Dane S. Ciolino, Moral Rights and Real
Obligations:A Property-LawFrameworkfor the ProtectionofAuthors'MoralRights, 69 TuL. L.
REV. 935, 943 (1995). It may therefore be preferable to take a fresh approach to these rights and
regard them rather as proprietaryobligations imposed on the holder of the relevant copyright to
the benefit of the author or artist, perhaps like the obligation a trustee owes to a beneficiary.
181. Although the United States has some moral rights legislation, see for example, the Visual
Artists Rights Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990), European jurisdictions have
historically been more vigilant about protecting such rights. Liemer, supra note 177, at 42.
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perhaps through the auspices of international organization, like the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).s 2
B. Modeling Obligationsof Information Property Ownership
1. Property Ownership and Responsibility
Conceptualizing information property rights as incorporating important
legal duties is to some extent a new way of looking at an old problem.
Many scholars have expressed well-grounded fears about the overcommodification of information in the digital age, particularly vis-6z-vis the
ability of those with competing interests in information to access and use
relevant information'8 3 or to prevent or restrict certain uses of the
information by the information property holder. The framework presented
here is a new way of addressing some of these concerns.
I advocate the imposition of significant legal duties on information
property holders to ensure that the right holders themselves shoulder the
bulk of, or at least a reasonable proportion of, the legal and financial
burdens inherent in achieving a socially-appropriate balance of competing
interests in information. This requirement is particularly important where
a person asserting a competing interest to an information property right is
at a significant disadvantage to the right holder in terms of resources to
protect his or her interest.
This will clearly be a difficult outcome to achieve in practice because
it is important not to lose the necessary incentives to create information
property as a result of this balancing exercise.'" 4 The creation of
information property is an important benefit to society. But balancing
those rights appropriately with other rights is also important to society.
Many would argue that this sense of balance is currently missing in much
of our information property law.
Attempts to redress the balance have, to date, drawn from the models
of intellectual property law previously discussed-the reliance on fair use
exceptions to information property rights and on limiting the scope of
those rights. Although both of these methods are important and should be
retained, neither of them deals as directly with imbalances of bargaining
power as the model suggested here, which redistributes the financial
burdens of protecting competing interests in information.

182. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., OVERVIEW OF WIPO, at http://www.wipo.org/
about-wipo/en/overview.html (last visited Sept. 8, 2003).
183. See sources cited supra note 48.
184. See Wagner, supra note 3, at 997 (referring to the incentive effects of intellectual
property rights).
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Further, neither of them contributes significantly to providing a unified
general framework for thinking about the nature of information property
more generally in terms of the optimal social balance between information
property rights and competing interests in relevant information.
The framework I suggest for incorporating affirmative legal duties on
information property holders as part of granting the privilege of the
relevant rights draws to some extent from ideas already inherent in
intellectual property law. Some of the more obvious examples of duties
inherent in owning intellectual property have already been identified
above. The framework also draws on other areas of law, notably traditional
Property law.
Obviously, traditional tangible Property rights are not the same as
intangible information property rights for the reasons set out in the
Introduction. However, traditional Property law and theory does provide
plenty of examples of a legal dynamic involving the juxtaposition of the
grant of a powerful private right against an often equally powerful duty or
responsibility owed to another person or group of people. We might learn
something about balancing rights and duties in information by examining
some of these dynamics from traditional Property law, while bearing in
mind the distinct differences between information property and traditional
Property as legal assets.
The familiar "bundle of rights" description of traditional tangible
Property,'85 for example, explains Property in terms of a "bundle" of sticks
that make up the various rights held by its owner. 186 Property can exist in
different items with more or fewer sticks in the bundle.'87 The typical
"sticks," or "rights," connoting Property ownership under this model are
the rights to use, exclude others from, and transfer an item. 88 These rights,
in particular, are the hallmarks of the ability to trade with an item in
commerce. The ability to use and transfer something gives the owner the
opportunity to profit from the item, while the right to exclude others can
preserve its value if the same or similar items are not freely, or more

185. For an examination ofthe "bundle of sticks" metaphor's pedigree, see Penner, supra note
26, at 713 n.8.
186. ROSE, supra note 32, at 278-79; James Boyle, A Theory of Law and Information:
Copyright,Spleens, Blacknail,andInsiderTrading,80 CAL. L. REV. 1413, 1459 (1992); Kenneth
Campbell, On the General Nature of PropertyRights, 3 KING'S COLLEGE L.J. 79, 90 (1992);
Chander, supra note 1, at 776; Fisher, supra note 6, at 1207; Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries
of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 1191 (1999); Samuelson, supra note I, at 370.
187. Samuelson, supra note 1, at 370-71. Samuelson says that a bundle of rights may be
thicker or thinner but need not have a particular thickness to rise to the status of Property; thus, it
is possible that information products can amount to Property under the bundle of rights description.
Id.
188. JACQUELINE D. LIPTON, SECURITY OVER INTANGIBLE PROPERTY 12-14 (2000); Chander,
supra note 1, at 776.
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cheaply, available from other sources. Thus, Property is a useful concept
for promoting efficient market transactions.18 9
This idea of Property has held some attraction for those who argue in
favor of justifying a conceptualization of information as Property. A
number of scholars have suggested that information can be Property in the
"bundle of rights" sense of the term, if one accepts a different type of
"rights" making up the "bundle" than is contemplated in traditional
Property theory.' 90
Whether or not one accepts this description of information property
rights, what is often forgotten about the "bundle of rights" notion of
Property, particularly when drawing parallels with information property,
is that the bundle does not only include rights. Traditionally, it has also
included obligations owed by the Property holder to other members of
society. 9 ' Examples of such obligations are: the obligation to maintain the
premises in good repair; 92 the obligation to allow certain persons access
to the Property for particular purposes;'93 the obligation to pay taxes when
required by the government; and the obligation to cede the Property to the
government if required.' 94
If this idea of Property holders' obligations were incorporated into
information property theory, the kinds of obligations involved would be
different from those arising in the world of physical Property. They might
include things like: an obligation to facilitate scientific, technical, and
educational uses of information; an obligation to ensure the accuracy and
accessibility of any personal information to an individual that may have
been incorporated into a proprietary database; 95 an obligation not to
subject relevant parts of an information product incorporating an author's

189. See ROSE, supra note 32, at 28.
190. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
191. See Joan L. McGregor, Property Rights and Environmental Protection:Is This Land
Made for You and Me?, 31 ARIz. ST. L.J. 391, 396 (1999) (discussing that Hohfeld's bundle of
rights theory of Property includes a duty of a Property owner to prevent harm to others); Penner,
supra note 26, at 761 (stating that Honor6's concept of ownership includes the prohibition of
harmful use of Property).
192. For a statutory example of this duty in the landlord and tenant context, see OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5321.04 (Anderson 2003) (setting out statutory duties of a landlord to maintain
premises in good repair).
193. See Fisher, supra note 6, at 1203 (noting the qualifications and exceptions to Property
rights in the physical world).
194. This happens in the United States under the doctrine of eminent domain, which is the
power of a sovereign to take Property for public use without the owner's consent. J. SACKMAN,
NICHOLS ON EMIwENTDoMN § 1.11 (rev. 3d ed. 1983); David B. Fawcett III, Comment, Eminent
Domain, The Police Power, and the Fifth Amendment: Defining the Domain of the Takings
Analysis, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 491, 491 (1986).
195. This could be modeled on legal systems which include obligations of accuracy and
rectification in personal information. See Privacy Act, 1988, §§ 14.7-14.8 (Austl.).
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creative work to derogatory treatment or to falsely attribute the work; 96
and an obligation to protect cultural rights and interests in relevant
information assets. Additional possibilities would include the obligation
to submit to a compulsory licensing scheme in situations where there are
powerful public policy interests in favor of such a scheme.' 97
These obligations are clearly not exact parallels to those arising under
the traditional bundle of rights (and obligations) picture of Property. This
is because the nature of information property is quite different to that of
traditional Property, and the interests that need to be balanced against
information property rights are, again, quite distinct from those arising in
the traditional Property context. Thus, I am here drawing on the dynamics
underlying the traditional bundle of rights idea of Property to create a new
framework for balancing competing interests in information property. I am
not suggesting exact parallels between the two systems in terms of rights
and obligations of the property holder.
Although some ofthe specific ideas of information property obligations
suggested above may seem far fetched or difficult to achieve politically,
it is important to keep in mind that quite powerful legal duties have been
imposed on Property owners throughout the ages, particularly in relation
to land ownership.' 98 It is not an impossible step to draw on similar public
policy concerns in the information age to create the same kind of dynamic
in relation to information property rights and competing interests. Real
Property ownership, like information property ownership, has powerful
social consequences. The ability to own and potentially monopolize land,
like the ability to own and monopolize information and ideas, is something

196. This supports the idea that the owner of an information product should have a legal duty
to protect an author's moral rights to a work rather than the entire legal and financial burden of
protecting the moral right resting solely on the author's shoulders.
197. Compulsory licensing is both politically and practically difficult to achieve and
implement and was, in fact, deleted from the final version of the E.U. Database Directive. See
Reichman & Samuelson, supra note 3, at 86. However, it may be necessary to seriously rethink the
adoption of compulsory licensing regimes with respect to property rights in some information
products if a government's policy aims in the digital information economy are to include an
appropriate balance between private rights and public interests. There are a number of practical
examples of compulsory licensing in place today which could be used as models for evaluating
their effectiveness in adopting compulsory licensing obligations for digital information products.
See Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 48 (Eng.). In particular, compulsory licensing comes up repeatedly
in debates about international access to patented pharmaceuticals. See Dora Kripapuri, Reasoned
CompulsoryLicensing:Applying US. Antitrust's 'Rule ofReason 'to TRIP's Compulsory Licensing
Provision,36 NEW ENG. L. REV. 669,669-70 (2002); Patrick Marc, CompulsoryLicensing andthe
South African Medicine Act of 1997: Violation or Compliance of the Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual PropertyRights Agreement?, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 109, 109 (2001);
Joseph A. Yosick, Compulsory Patent Licensingfor Efficient Use of Inventions, 2001 U, ILL. L.
REV. 1275, 1276.
198. See infra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
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that must be carefully organized and monitored to achieve maximum
benefits for society and, in particular, for those with legitimate competing
interests in relevant property.
2. Land Law
To take the analysis further, we might consider some relevant aspects
of traditional land law. Land law has never granted absolute rights to real
Property owners.'99 Duties to the public at large, specific individuals, or
groups of people have always been imposed on private land holders. One
example is the obligation imposed on a life tenant (Property owner) to
protect the interests of the remaindermen of the relevant Property under
the doctrine of waste." 0 Another example is the obligation imposed on a
landlord to maintain premises in good repair for the benefit of tenants and
others who may enter the premises." 1 As mentioned previously, there are
also more general public obligations, like the obligation to pay property
taxes. Other proprietary obligations in traditional land law are imposed by
easements and restrictive covenants.20 2
The above examples from land law demonstrate that even in an area
where significantly powerful Property rights are granted, often equally
powerful obligations will be imposed on Property owners to maintain an
appropriate balance of interests in the relevant land. It is not for a tenant
to establish to the satisfaction of a court that she has some vague right not
to be injured by the state on the premises in question. It is, rather, an
obligation imposed squarely on the landlord by law, even though the
tenant may have to initiate legal action to ensure that the landlord fulfills
her duties.20 3 This can be onerous for the tenant, but not as onerous as

199. Eminent domain, which is the power of a sovereign to take Property for public use
without the owner's consent, is the most obvious example of how Property rights are not absolute.
SACKMAN, supra note 194, § 1. 11; Fawcett, supranote 194, at 491. The sovereign can always take
Property from Property owners, although it may have to pay compensation. See Fawcett, supranote
194, at 491.
200. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY §§ 156, 197, 204 (1936) (commenting on the
duties of holders of present interests in Property to preserve the rights of certain future interest
holders); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, 83-84 (5th ed. 1998).
201. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04 (Anderson 2003) (setting forth the statutory
duties of a landlord to maintain premises in good repair).
202. See WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHTMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 435-40 (3d
ed. 2000).
203. In some states there may also be criminal sanctions for failing to fulfill the obligation to
maintain the premises in good repair. The criminalization of this conduct clearly connotes the
general, public nature of the obligations imposed on the property holder. The failure to maintain
leased premises in a habitable condition is a violation of local housing or building codes in various
states and is a breach of the common law warranty of implied habitability. Sanctions for failure to
comply with housing or building codes include substantial fines, which are compounded daily.
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convincing a court that she actually has a basic right to enjoy the premises
in good repair.
Contrast this with the fair use approach to information property rights,
where a user will often shoulder the burden of establishing to the
satisfaction of a court that she has a right to make the use in question. This
does not even take into account the difficulties that might be faced in
establishing a right to access a relevant information product in order to get
to the point of arguing about fair use. Real Property owners are entitled to
use and enjoy their Property and to exploit it commercially. However, they
also owe duties to others that can be enforced by those to whom a duty is
owed. This dynamic can be adapted to the field of information property
rights.
I am not advocating the application of land law rules mutatis mutandis
to information property. There are significant differences between the two
systems, as I have addressed above. I am merely suggesting drawing from
the underlying dynamics of land law to rethink the boundaries of
information property rights vis-6?-vis competing interests in information.
In fact, one obvious difference between the land law obligations
described above and obligations that may be attached to information
property ownership, other than the specific content of the duties, lies in the
nature of the rights of those to whom the duties are owed. Many land law
duties are owed to individuals with a competing proprietary or contractual
interest in the relevant land. Tenants and remaindermen, for example, hold
competing proprietary interests in land." 4 Tenants' interests are also
obviously contractual.2"5 Some obligations imposed on real Property
owners will be more public in nature, like an obligation to allow public
access to property that might be created under an easement." 6 However,
many easements are often originally created by contractual arrangements
rather than by governmental requirement. 0 7
Information property obligations, on the other hand, at least in the
context under discussion here, would largely be owed to those who are not
necessarily claiming a competingproprietaryor even contractualinterest
in relevant information. People seeking access to proprietary information
would likely be doing so for scientific, educational, and research purposes,
Criminal sanctions are imposed for criminal contempt when a landlord fails to comply with court
or agency orders. See, e.g., State of New Jersey, Borough of E. Paterson, Bd. of Health v. Elmwood
Terrace, Inc., 204 A. 2d 379 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1964) (landlord convicted of failing to
provide sufficient heating in its apartments); State of New Jersey v. Kiejdan, 437 A. 2d 324 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) (apartment owner convicted of violations of local health ordinance for
failure to provide adequate heating on premises).
204. STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 202, at 206-07, 271-75.
205. Id. at 253-55.
206. Id. at 449-51.
207. Id. at 442-44.
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while people seeking to restrict certain proprietary uses of information
may be doing so on the basis of privacy rights, moral rights, and/or
cultural interests in relevant information.
Obliging information property holders to support these interests may
look somewhat like imposing easements and restrictive covenants on
information property holders. Requiring information property holders to
allow access to certain competing interest holders may look like an
information age equivalent of a government-created easement in relevant
information, while requiring information property holders to refrain from
making certain uses of information might resemble an information age
restrictive covenant, or perhaps a zoning restriction.2 °8
To this extent we might borrow frameworks from land law that balance
competing interests in real Property in order to inform ways of balancing
competing interests in information. However, we must bear in mind that
we are merely borrowing the framework and basic dynamics of the land
law system, and not suggesting that information is Property in the
traditional sense, nor that the only way to temper the unfettered
exploitation of an information property right is to assert a competing
proprietary or contractual right in relevant information.
Another benefit of considering land law principles in developing a new
model for balancing competing interests in information is that land law has
traditionally been able to deal with situations where obligations may be
owed by a property holder to more than one person at a time and where not
all potential beneficiaries of an obligation are necessarily identified at the
time of creation of the Property right. The doctrine of waste, for example,
has traditionally dealt with situations where remaindermen may not be
identifiable, and may even not be born, at the time of the creation of the
life estate.20 9
Thus, in the information property context, it would not be a problem
that potential beneficiaries of an obligation imposed on an information
property holder would not necessarily be identifiable at the time of
creation of the information property interest. If a proprietary interest in a
particular database came into existence prior to a scientist developing an
interest in accessing a portion of that database, the scientist's interest
might nevertheless be included in a general obligation attached to database
ownership to allow access for certain scientific and educational purposes.
Trust law, too, has dealt with situations where a Property holder owes
significant duties to the trust beneficiaries whether or not all beneficiaries
are named or identifiable at the time of trust's creation. 2'0 Trust law is
208. Id. at 575-79.
209. POSNER, supra note 200, at 83-84.
210. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 120, 122 (1959) (commenting on the rules for
creating a valid trust for a class of beneficiaries). The trust rules will not apply mutatis mutandis
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clearly not a perfect analogy to what is being described here because the
trustee's sole charge is to hold Property for the benefit of others.21 ' The
information property holder on the other hand, like the real Property holder
described above, is permitted to utilize his or her property for his or her
own commercial benefit while at the same time safeguarding certain
competing interests.
Trust law is, in fact, an interesting metaphor here. Professor Ryan has
suggested that it is possible to create a public-trust model for information
property rights in cyberspace as a solution to the perceived overcommodification of digital information.1 2 She argues that we could
develop a public-trust model to protect the public domain of information
and ideas in cyberspace.213 This interesting and valuable argument is taken
up in more detail towards the end of this discussion.
However, it is important to distinguish Professor Ryan's suggestions
from my own. Professor Ryan is talking about using a trust model in a
public domain sense to protect an intellectual commons. 14 I am suggesting
the use of a model drawn from ideas of private Property that incorporates
specific duties inherent in Property ownership to achieve some balance
between competing private interests in information. My model is not
addressed specifically at protection of the public domain per se, although
aspects of the model may indirectly enhance the public domain-for
example, where a scientist or educator gains access to particular
information under this framework and uses it to create new information
that enriches the public domain.21 5
3. Locke and Obligations of Property Ownership
We might also consider Lockean notions of Property2 6 to see whether
any of the relevant jurisprudence contributes to the proposed framework
for information property duties under discussion here. A consideration of
Locke's work is important in this context because Lockean ideas of
to the model suggested in this Article, but as a loose parallel it shows that the law has not
previously objected to creating obligations towards a group of people that may in some way be
identified by the obligor at some point after the creation of the Property right in question.
211. Id. § 170(l) (noting that the trustee has a duty to administer the trust solely in the interest
of the beneficiaries); JOHN GLOVER, COMMERCIAL EQUITY: FIDuCIARY RELATIONSHIPS 156-86
(1995) (commenting on the duties of the trustee not to make personal profits from the trust and not
to put himself or herself in a position where his/her interests conflict with those of the beneficiary).
212. Maureen Ryan, Cyberspaceas PublicSpace: A Public Trust Paradigmfor Copyright in
the Digital World, 79 OR. L. REv. 647, 648 (2000).
213. Id.
214. See id.

215. Wagner, supra note 3, at 1003-10 (describing how particular uses of information can
enhance the public domain).
216. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT §§ 27-36 (Lester DeKoster ed.,

William B. Redmons Publ'g Co. 1978) (1690).
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Property were historically used to justify the grant of Property rights in the
physical world 7 and have increasingly come to be utilized to justify the
grant of intellectual property rights."'
The idea of balancing private rights against certain duties attaching to
Property ownership is certainly inherent in the Lockean justification for
Property rights.2 19 In fact, an interesting divergence between the way that
Lockean Property theory was originally explained in relation to realty and
the way it is now utilized in the context of information property rights
involves the imposition of duties on property owners.
Traditional Lockean theory always contemplated that Property owners
would owe particular obligations to society related to their Property
ownership.220 However, in the information property context, these
obligations have been largely overlooked. Although some commentators
in the intellectual property context have tackled these obligations,22 ' there
is, as yet, no consensus as to how they should play out in information
property law and theory. This is perhaps not surprising as there is still no
real consensus as to how these obligations are played out in the physical
world.222

217. See Richard A. Epstein, PrivateProperty and the Power of Eminent Domain: A Last
Word on Eminent Domain, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 253, 254-57 (1986) (applying Locke's theory to
the United States real Property system); McGregor, supranote 191, at 399-413 (examining the of
Lockean influence on modem real Property theory); Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of
Property,52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 73 (1985) (noting the prevalence ofthe Lockean theory to explain
Property law); Herman Schwartz, Property Rights and the Constitution: Will the Ugly Duckling
Become a Swan?, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 9, 12-19 (1987) (analyzing how Lockean theory has been
applied to real Property law in the United States).
218. See Damstedt, supra note 18, at 1179-81 (noting the importance of Lockean theory in
justifying intellectual property rights); Fisher, supra note 6, at 1212-15 (recognizing the Lockean
justification for intellectual property rights); Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 1, at 1549-64
(applying Lockean theory to intellectual property); Gordon, On Owning Information,supra note
1, at 169-70 (criticizing Lockean theory in the intellectual property context); Hettinger, supra note
1, at 36-47 (applying Lockean analysis to intellectual property); Hughes, supranote 1, at 297-330
(setting forth Lockean analysis of intellectual property rights and obligations); Moore, supra note
1, at65.
219. See Damstedt, supra note 18, at 1181; Hughes supra note 1, at 297.
220. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 315-29 (recognizing the Lockean provisos not to waste
resources and to leave as much and as good to the commons, as applied to intellectual property).
22 1. Fisher, supra note 6, at 1212-15 (recognizing the Lockean justification for intellectual
property rights); Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 1, at 1549-64 (applying Lockean theory to
intellectual property); Gordon, On Owning Information,supra note 1, 169-70 (criticizing Lockean
theory in the intellectual property context); Hettinger, supra note 1, at 36-47 (applying Lockean
analysis to intellectual property); Hughes, supra note 1, at 297-330 (discussing Lockean analysis
of intellectual property rights and obligations); Moore, supra note 1, at 65.
222. See Adam Mossoff, Locke's Labor Lost, 9 U. CHI. L. SCH. RoUNDTABLE 155 (2002)
(critiquing previous literature on the application of Lockean theory to general property law); see
also supra note 217 and accompanying text.
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Traditional Lockean theory holds that one is entitled to a Property right
' Locke also included a proviso (that could
in the "fruits of one's labor."223
be regarded as a duty of ownership) that as much and as good be left to the
common.2 2 4 He additionally included a concern that Property not be
wasted,225 and that the appropriation of Property by one person does not
harm others in the society.226 These concerns can be interpreted as
examples of duties imposed on a Property owner. They do, however,
exemplify the differences between real Property ownership and
information property ownership, as Locke's concern was largely to explain
how to avoid a tragedy of the commons22 7 in rivalrous resources, which
might otherwise not be optimally exploited.228
The Lockean provisos on ownership make more sense in relation to
tangible goods like land, crops, and livestock, than in relation to intangible
goods like information.229 Because information can exist in more than one
place at the same time, and it is far from clear that there is an intellectual
commons of information and ideas,23 the Lockean theory does not neatly
map on to information property in relation to obligations to leave as much
and as good in the common, and not to waste goods. Thus, Lockean ideas
of Property have somewhat limited relevance to the model for information
property interests contemplated here. This is because the Lockean notion
of Property is grounded in the realities of the physical world, where a key
concern is optimizing society's use of tangible resources.23 '

223. See Francis A. Citera, Vested Seniority Rights: A ConceptualApproach, 36 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 751, 757 (1982); Damstedt, supra note 18, at 1181 (stating that a person is entitled to a
property right in the product of his efforts under Lockean theory applied to intellectual property);
id. at 1193 (acknowledging the fruits of one's labors justification for property in Lockean theory);
Stephen R. Munzer, The Acquisition ofPropertyRights, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 661, 675 (1991)
(assuming that it is morally wrong for a non-worker to intercept the fruits of a worker's efforts).
224. Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 1, at 1562-63; Hughes, supra note 1, at 297-98.
225. Hughes, supra note 1, at 298. A number of other duties can be found in Locke's treatises,
including a duty to let others share in one's resources in times of great need, a duty not to interfere
in resources produced by others laboring on the common, and a duty not to harm others. See
Gordon, Self-xpression, supra note 1, at 1541-43.
226. See Gordon,Self-Expression, supranote 1,at 1541-43; Hettinger, supranote 1, at 39-40.
227. See ROSE, supranote 32, at 106 (citing Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy ofthe Commons, 162
SCIENCE 1243 (1968)); Wagner, supra note 3, at 1001.
228. See ROSE, supra note 32, at 106; Wagner, supra note 3, at 1001.
229. Damstedt, supra note 18, at 1188 (stating that intangible goods can be used at the same
time by different people as opposed to tangible, rivalrous goods which may only be used by one
person at a time).
230. Some literature does assume that there is an intellectual commons of information, ideas,
and works that reside in the public domain and are not owned by anyone. See supra note 153 and
accompanying text.
231. ROSE, supra note 32, at 106.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2004

45

Florida Law Review, Vol. 56, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 2

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56

Although Locke's idea of Property again demonstrates the important
dynamic of balancing the rights of a Property holder against important
concurrent social responsibilities, the specifics of those rights and
responsibilities are too heavily grounded in the physical, tangible world to
directly inform the development of a framework for balancing competing
interests in information. In any event, the duties contemplated by Locke
are not owed to any specific individual or group of individuals, but to
society as a whole.232 Thus, if applied to the information property context,
they fit more neatly within debates about preservation of an intellectual
commons of information and ideas as a general public-interest limitation
on the creation of information property rights,23 3 than to debates about
balancing information property rights, once granted, against specific
competing interests.
One might argue that it is wrong to consider the second
problem-balancing competing interests in information-without fully
resolving the first-granting information property rights that do not
interfere in an unjustified way with the intellectual commons. However,
I assume that, for better or worse, we will always have some degree of
information property in our midst, and it is important not to lose sight of
the debate about balancing those rights against the specific competing
interests of others to relevant information.
From the above, it is clear that the more traditional ideas of real-world
Property tell us some important things about how we might think about
information property in balancing competing interests to relevant
information. Both the Lockean theory of Property and the traditional
bundle of rights description of Property emphasize the need to balance
rights and duties in relation to Property ownership.234
The traditional Property theories remind us that along with Property
rights come important responsibilities. The responsibilities will vary with
the nature of the rights in question and with the nature of the competing
interests in those rights. Nevertheless, any kind of Property rights,
including information property rights, should be tempered by necessary
legal duties imposed on the right holder as an incident of property
ownership.
These duties are not the same as mere limitations on the scope of the
relevant rights, nor are they akin to defenses that may be asserted by
competing interest holders in infringement actions brought by property
holders. They require property owners to affirmatively shoulder key legal
232. Cf Gordon, Self-Expression, supra note 1, at 1541 ("Since all humanity is equal in the
state of nature, the duties we owe others are also the duties they owe us, and the rights I have
against others they have against me.").
233. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 191 and 220 and accompanying text.
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and financial burdens of balancing their rights against identified competing
interests in relevant property.
This clearly connotes a distinct difference in emphasis and practice
from current frameworks for limiting the exercise of information property
rights. It also provides a potentially unified overarching model for
information property that can inform specific developments in areas like
copyright law, patent law, and contractual information licensing law, so
that these areas develop a societal information balance in a more clear and
harmonized manner than may have been the case in the past.
4. Obligations of Information Property Ownership
The task of imposing legal obligations on information property holders
as an incident of their ownership is not as alien as it might first seem. A
number of legal duties already exist in intellectual property law, even
though they are not specifically described as obligations in the sense
detailed in this Article.235 The problem in the current system, therefore, is
not that there are no obligations imposed on information property owners.
Rather, the balance of rights and obligations is in the wrong place. There
are insufficient obligations imposed on information property holders to
support important competing interests.
Additionally, the current obligations of information property ownership
do not effectively deal with situations involving the use of contractual and
technological protection measures by information property holders.
Obligations to preserve scientific and technological advancement,
education, moral rights, personal privacy rights, and cultural rights need
to be more powerful than current contractual and technological measures
that restrict access to, and use of, information assets.
The obligations currently existing as a condition of ownership of
certain intellectual property rights are a useful starting point for
considering the development of more detailed and powerful social
obligations for information property. Current intellectual property regimes
at least demonstrate that no Property rights, including intellectual property
rights, have ever been absolute. Intellectual property right holders have
traditionally been subject to government-mandated obligations as a
condition of their property ownership.236 These are obligations (duties) to
affirmatively take particular action in respect of various kinds of
information property.
For example, as a pre-condition to the grant of a number of intellectual
property rights, a developer will often be required to submit to registration

235. See infra notes 237-50 and accompanying text.
236. See infra notes 237-50 and accompanying text.
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procedures that may involve disclosure of valuable information,237
submission to expert examination,238 and submission of various affidavits
in respect of current and intended uses of the property in question.239
In some jurisdictions, intellectual property right holders are subject to
compulsory licensing regimes with respect to their rights.24 ° This is an
obvious example of the imposition of a potential legal duty inherent in an
information property right. Right holders under these schemes are subject
to certain limitations on their property rights and are required to license
their property to others when public policy interests mandate that result in
a given case.241 Although compulsory licensing can be contentious and
problematic in practice,242 it is a clear example of a legislative balance
between private rights in an information product and competing interests
in preventing unfair monopolies in the relevant information. The right
holder is subject to an obligation to license the property to another when
to3 do so by a public authority and where there is a public-interest
required 24
concern.

Another example of an obligation inherent in intellectual property
ownership is found in trademark law. In most jurisdictions, trademark law
requires registered trademark holders to submit to cancellation of
registration if their mark becomes "generic.,, 244 This can be regarded as an
obligation to return to society a private asset when the public need for
access to that information product outweighs the justification for the
private right.245
237. An obvious example is found in patent schemes requiring inventors to disclose the full
details of inventions for which a patent is claimed in return for the grant of the patent. 35 U.S.C.
§ 111 (2000). In the United States, applicants for copyright registration must disclose certain
information about the copyright work in question. 17 id. § 409. This is not the case in many other
jurisdictions, including E.U. Member States, that do not have any copyright registers and therefore
have no copyright registration requirements.
238. Again, patent law provides an obvious example here. 35 id. § 131. There are also
examination and publication requirements in trademark law. 15 id.§ 1062(a).
239. In the trademark law context, see id. § 1051 (requiring applicants for trademark
registration to submit affidavits in relation to bonafide existing or intended uses of the relevant
mark).
240. See Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 48 (Eng.).
241. Id. § 50(l)(a) (requiring public interest to be taken into account in compulsory licensing
decision).
242. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
243. See Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, §§ 48-50 (Eng.). The compulsory licensing scheme in the
British patent legislation allows compulsory licenses of patents in the public interest, provided that
the patentee is reasonably compensated. See id. § 50(l)(a) (public interest criteria); id. § 50(1)(b)
(compensation to patent holder).
244. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3); Trade Marks Act, 1995, § 24 (Austi.); Trade Marks Act, 1994,
c. 26, § 46(l)(c) (Eng.).
245. Hughes, supra note 1,at 322-23 (describing this phenomenon in terms of Lockean
Property theory by stating that once the private property owner has been so successful in its
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In other words, when a mark becomes generic, it is unfair to allow the
registrant of the mark to continue to monopolize it as a private asset. A
generic mark has effectively entered the public domain as part of the
general vocabulary, and it should not be private property. Inherent in the
grant of the original private property right in the mark is the
understanding, or condition, that if the mark becomes generic it will be
surrendered into the public domain in the public interest. This example
relates more to balancing private interests in an information product
against the needs of the public domain of information and ideas. However,
it is nevertheless an example of the imposition of a legal duty on an
information-product owner as an incident, or at least a condition, of
property ownership.
Even the built-in expiration dates of intellectual property rights-like
those existing for copyrights and patents--could be regarded as examples
of a right holders' obligation to return information assets to the public
domain; 246 however, in the modem world these obligations have clearly
been tempered by contractual and technological measures that right
holders may employ 24
to maintain their private property after the statutory
obligation wears off. 1
The limits on duration of certain information property rights can be
regarded as either a basic limitation on the scope of the right or as an
obligation to surrender the relevant information into the public domain at
a particular point in time as a condition of the original property grant. In
current legal systems, it is arguable that the time limits on such property
are, in fact, more appropriately regarded as bare limitations on the rights,
rather than public obligations, as they do not impose any affirmative duties
on right holders. In other words, there is no affirmative duty to refrain
from utilizing contractual and technological measures to effectively extend
the scope of a property grant both in terms of duration and in terms of
protected
content,248 unless possibly preempted by an intellectual property
24 9
law.

marketing that it has "lull[ed] the society into a dependency on a privately owned word," the
property owner should be obliged to return the word to a permanent common).
246. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. Patent rights generally last for a thirty-four
year maximum period. Hughes, supra note 1, at 323. It could be argued that even this time limit
is too long given the nature of many information products involving things like digital information
products and life-saving pharmaceuticals. See id. at 323-24 (describing the expiration of
intellectual property rights in Lockean terms as an obligation to return appropriated assets to the
commons).
247. See Fisher, supra note 6, at 1203.
248. For example, non-original databases do not merit any specific intellectual property
protection in the United States. However, they may effectively be commodified through the use
of contractual and technological protection measures.
249. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453-54 (7th Cir. 1996) (discussing the
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An obligation, as opposed to a bare limitation on property scope, would
require property holders to refrain from utilizing contractual and
technological measures to extend their monopoly of a'given information
product in certain ways.25 ° In other words, the obligation would involve an
affirmative duty to return an information product to the public domain at
the expiration of a statutory protection period. This would more effectively
protect relevant public interests, although it would certainly involve a
delicate balance between promoting property, commerce, and freedom of
contract, on the one hand, and protecting the public interest on the other.
Again, we are talking here about balancing private interests in
information against the public domain of information and ideas. The fact
that many of the existing obligations of information property ownership
deal with the public domain balance is evidence of the need to revisit the
question of how to effectively balance information property rights with
specific competing private interests that may be asserted by one or more
individuals.
We are obviously somewhat familiar with the idea of imposing
obligations on information property owners to protect the public domain
per se. However, we are less familiar with thinking globally about how to
effectively balance competing private interests in information once the
initial grant of an information property right has been made. There are
" ' and
some examples of this in intellectual property law, like the fair use25
252
first sale doctrines in copyright law. However, I argue that we now need
to pay greater attention to the overall balance of competing interests in
information products generally.
5. Rights and Duties: Finding the Right Balance
Any new legal duties imposed on information property holders should,
at the very least, cover areas that have previously been described as
involving fair use defenses, privacy rights, moral rights, and cultural rights
in information. In the past, all of these areas have created difficulties for
the legal system, partly because of their content and the difficulties
associated with balancing rights in information, and partly because of the
way in which these rights have been conceptualized.
However, any system for balancing private property rights in
information against other rights and interests in information will encounter
possibility that contractual license over intellectual property could be preempted by copyright law
but ultimately upholding the validity of the license).
250. Fisher, supra note 6, at 1233-34 (acknowledging certain situations in which allowing
property rights holders to increase their power through contractual and technological protection
measures may be socially undesirable).
251. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
252. Id. § 106(3).
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difficult policy choices. These choices will relate to which interests to
prefer in which contexts and to what extent. For example, how far will a
personal privacy right in information extend vis-ti-vis the rights of a
commercial database producer? Will the database producer be restrained
from including any personal information in a database without express
permission from the individual in question?. 3 Will the database producer
be restrained from including personal information that is not essential to
a particular business purpose?" 4 Alternatively, will the database producer
be permitted to include all personal information with a caveat that the
database producer must allow access by individuals to check the accuracy
of their personal information? 2 .
Importantly, we need to remember that balancing rights and duties of
information ownership must be just that-a balance. Duties should not be
imposed that are so onerous that they decrease incentives to produce
information goods. However, many would argue that the current balance
favors information property developers to the detriment of other
competing
interests 256 and to the detriment of the public domain as a
257
whole.
Empirically proving where an appropriate balance should be struck, in
terms of either information property versus competing private interests in
information or information property versus the public domain, may well
be an impossible task. Nevertheless, a better balance may be found in both
cases by bringing new voices more prominently into the relevant debates.
Both courts and legislatures should be alert to the importance of protecting
the competing interests in information of individuals and groups, which
may not have significant resources to lobby Congress, but which may have
very valid reasons to expect the law to effectively protect their interests in

253. See Mike Hatch, The Privatization of Big Brother: Protecting Sensitive Personal
Informationfrom CommercialInterestsin the 21st Century,27 WM. MITcHELL L. REV. 1457, 14941501 (2001) (discussing the relative merits of opt-in and opt-out systems to sensitive personal
information collected by commercial entities); Thelen Reid & Priest, Internet Law Group, Internet
Law Update: Developments in Privacy Law-1999 (regarding opt-out of financial institutions'
required privacy disclosures under federal law and opt-in privacy regulations regarding telephone
soliciations promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission), at http://www.thelenreid.com/
articles/article/act_59_idx.html (last visited June 16, 2003); Allan Rubin, Patient'sRights andthe
Required Standardization(HIPAA) ofall MedicalForms (July, 2003) (explaining the Department
of Health and Human Services' new privacy rules, entitled the Standards for Privacy of Individually
Identifiable Health Information which became effective April 14, 2003), at
http://www.therubins.com/legal/hippa.htm (last visited June 16, 2003).
254. E.g., Directive on Data Protection, supra note 135, art. 6(l)(b) (indicating that data
should only be collected for "specified, explicit, and legitimate" purposes).
255. E.g., id. art. 12 (noting the right of access to data by data subjects).
256. See Sanuelson, supra note 25, at 519; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
257. See Madison, supra note 6, at 1097; Ryan, supra note 212, at 694-95.
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accessing or utilizing, or restricting or preventing, particular uses of
certain information.
Ultimately, information property right holders are arguably the most
effective candidates to shoulder the burdens of these duties. They are
likely to have the resources to establish methods for commercializing their
information assets while maintaining the ability to protect the interests of
others in that information. They could do this by having separate
departments or officers to deal with individual requests involving relevant
information. This is more viable and more likely to go some way towards
redressing the imbalance in information assets than the current system of
requiring people with lesser resources to either fight powerful, corporate
information providers or to surrender their interests to those information
owners.
Clearly such a scheme will require the support of government
institutions to ensure that private property holders perform their legal
duties effectively. However, this has been done in the past for obligations
attaching to real Property ownership. There is no reason to think the same
model could not work in relation to information property rights.
Affirmative duties attaching to information property ownership could
be developed through the common law or through legislation.
Unfortunately, it may be a little unrealistic to rely wholly on the commonlaw approach in this context. Courts have no guidance as to the basis upon
which they might impose affirmative duties on information property
owners. When faced with a tightly worded contractual license restricting
access to, and use of, proprietary information,258 a court has little statutory
guidance or common-law precedent that would necessarily suggest a duty
to be imposed on the information owner forcing the owner to permit
certain uses of the information outside the scope of the contract. The only
current exception to this might be in situations where courts could hold a
certain contractual license to be preempted by copyright law.259
Therefore, it may be necessary to enact legislation to adopt a scheme
that clarifies some of the duties attaching to information property
ownership and the sanctions for failing to perform those duties. This is not
an unusual or unprecedented step as there is plenty of existing law that
deals with obligations imposed on traditional Property owners as a
condition of their ownership.26

258. E.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
259. This was argued, although ultimately rejected on the facts, in ProCD.See id. at 1453-55
(holding that shrinkwrap agreements can be used to limit a user's fair use of a product under
copyright law).
260. E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (2000) (prohibiting housing discrimination); Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6991 (authorizing federal regulations
for handling, storage, and disposal of solid and hazardous wastes); Americans With Disabilities
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Because such legislation would be about information property
generally, it may not be clear where it would fit into the overall statutory
and common-law framework of laws dealing with proprietary and
contractual rights in information. This framework includes copyright
statutes, 261 patent statutes, 262 sui generis database protection statutes in
jurisdictions where they have been enacted, 263 and statutes relating to
information licensing in jurisdictions where they have been enacted. 2 "
This disparate framework may create some practical problems, but it
might at least be worth considering legislative approaches even if they
proceed on a piecemeal basis. The legislature could pass separate
amendments for the different legal regimes based on the fundamental
principles of imposing affirmative legal duties on information property
holders to preserve competing interests in information, both in terms of
access to and use of information, as well as the ability to restrict an
information property holder's ability to exploit proprietary information in
a culturally or morally objectionable way.
In some ways this piecemeal approach describes the current practice of
creating checks and balances on the exploitation of information property
rights; examples include fair use in the copyright context 265 and
compulsory licensing in the patent, 266 copyright, 267 and database
contexts. 2668However, the adoption of some general principles on balancing
competing interests in information products would surely help to inform
these specific debates in a more clear and harmonized manner, and could
underline the importance of imposing legal and financial burdens of
protecting the overall information balance in society on those more able
to shoulder the burden.

Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (establishing basic non-discrimination requirements that prohibit
public accommodations' exclusion, segregation, and unequal treatment ofpersons with disabilities);
Of-1o REV. CODE ANN. § 5321.04 (Anderson 2003) (explaining the statutory duties of a landlord
to maintain premises in good repair). For a discussion of zoning laws, see JAMES A. COON, LOCAL
GOVERNMENT TECHNICAL SERIES: ZONING AND THE COMPREHENSIVE PLAN (Dec. 1999), at

http://www.dos.state.ny.us/Igss/pdfs/zncompplan.pdf (last visited June 16, 2003).
261. See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-120.
262. See generally 35 id. §§ 1-375.
263. See generally Directive on the Protection of Databases, supra note 5.
264. E.g., UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT, supra note 78 (enacted in Virginia and
Maryland).
265. 17 U.S.C. § 107.
266. See Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 48 (Eng.).
267. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (setting forth a compulsory licensing scheme for non-dramatic musical
works).
268. See Reichman & Samuelson, supranote 3, at 86 (discussing the decision ofthe European
Union Council of Ministers to remove a compulsory licensing requirement for sole-source
information providers from the final draft of the E.U. Database Directive).
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6. The Public Domain
One could argue that a downside of the model proposed here is that it
does nothing to directly protect the public domain of information and
ideas. It creates specific obligations to individuals or groups of individuals
without creating a clear obligation mirroring the Lockean proviso to leave
as much and as good when appropriating property from the common.26 9
Naturally, this is assuming the existence of an "intellectual commons"
from which information property is appropriated. °
Regardless of how one feels about applying Lockean theory to justify
or explain the creation of information property rights, there is clearly a
public domain question that needs to be addressed by information property
law. However, the ideas presented in this Article are not intended directly
to address the public domain question per se. That problem needs to be
addressed by those considering initial questions about when and how
information property rights should be created in the first place. As noted
in the Introduction, I am focusing predominantly on a question arising at
a later point in time after some information has been appropriated from the
intellectual commons and some information property rights have been
created: the question of how, at that point, to effectively balance those
rights against competing interests in relevant information.
Many scholars have written about the public domain issue in the
information property context, and that debate will no doubt continue as
long as we have members of society wanting to assert property rights in
valuable information. In this context, Professor Madison has suggested the
development of a jurisprudence of the public domain in relation to
proprietary software issues.27 In a similar vein, Professor Ryan has
advocated a public-trust model for copyrighted works in particular.272
Other models are also being proposed for protection of the public
domain. An example is the current online petition in support of a Public
Domain Enhancement Act.273 This legislation, would require copyright
holders to pay a nominal fee fifty years after the publication of a copyright
work to retain a copyright in that work.274 If the owner was unwilling to

269. See Damstedt, supra note 18, at 1214 (stating that fair use in copyright transcends the
owner's property rights in relation to specific individuals, not specific assets).
270. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
271. Madison, supra note 6, at 1138-41 (advocating legislation to instruct courts to develop
a jurisprudence of fair use and the public domain in copyright law).
272. Ryan, supra note 212, at 647.
273. See Petition to Reclaim the Public Domain, to Members of the United States Congress
(2003), at http://www.petitiononline.com/eldred/petition.html (last visited June 9, 2003).
274. Id.
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pay the fee, the work would pass into the public domain.275 A number of
other initiatives for protecting the public domain in the digital age are
being examined by the recently established Center for the Study of the
Public Domain at Duke Law School.27 6
In the wake of these initiatives, I must acknowledge that while the
"legal duties" model advocated in this Article is an important step in
tailoring the information property concept to more effectively serve the
overall needs of society in relation to interests in information, the model
nevertheless relies on people asserting specific interests in information in
competition with those of an information property holder. It does not
protect the public domain generally.
The model presented in this Article deals with the balance of
competing interests in existing information property rights. The idea is to
create a more effective and harmonized theoretical basis for considering
questions relating to such a balance across various different areas of
information law. I am not, in this discussion, advocating any greater or
lesser amount of information property overall, nor am I directly tackling
questions relating to the preservation of the public domain in the context
of the creation of such rights.
Some of my suggestions might indirectly impact on the public domain
of information and ideas. For example, the creation of more access and use
rights to information products could ultimately lead to the enhancement of
the public domain, depending on what individual accessors and users do
with the information in question. A scientist or educator may build on
existing information to develop new information and thus enhance the
public domain. On the other hand, those asserting more restrictive interests
in information might ultimately restrict the public domain by removing
certain personal or cultural information from an existing information
product.
IV. GOVERNMENTAL OVERSIGHT

Under the model presented in this Article, the government would take
on some significant duties, potentially in terms of legislating for relevant
legal duties in information and in monitoring and enforcing the
performance of those duties by information property right holders. This
may strike some as undesirable. Many are suspicious of government
regulation of any kind, particularly as it might impact on commercial

275. Id.
276. See DUKE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE PUB. DOMAIN, available at

http://www.law.duke.edu/cspd/index.html (last visited June 9, 2003); see also Symposium, supra
note 14.
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markets.277 However, we must not forget that governments also legislate
to create information property rights-for example, copyrights and patents
and, in the European Union, sui generis database rights. Courts often
support similar rights created under contractual license.278 Asking the
governments who create, support, and enforce information property to also
create, support, and enforce concurrent affirmative duties imposed on
relevant right holders is not too much of a stretch (other than politically!).
The evidence of market power swaying government regulation in favor
of information property holders is there for all to see. Obvious examples
are: (a) amendments to copyright legislation in many jurisdictions to
clarify that computer software may attract copyright protection as a
literary work;27 9 (b) the enactment of sui generis legislation to protect
proprietary interests in semiconductor chips;28 ° (c) the enactment of the
E.U. Database Directive to create new sui generis property rights in
databases; 28' (d) the insertion of the DMCA into title 17 of the United
States Code to protect technological locks employed by copyright
holders, 2 2 and the equivalent provisions of the E.U. Copyright
Directive; 283 and, (e) legislation aimed at protecting proprietary trade
secrets, like the Uniform Trade Secrets Act and the federal Economic
Espionage Act.2 4 If legislatures are prepared to take such measures, they
should also be prepared to monitor the exploitation of the rights they have
created to ensure that important competing interests in information are not
threatened by the property rights.
In the absence of specific legal obligations imposed on information
property owners to exploit their rights in a way that does not adversely
impact on science, technology, education, moral rights, cultural rights,
and/or personal privacy rights, there is no market reason why information
owners would be sensitive to those issues. Recent history has certainly
shown a low tolerance by information property holders to some of these

277. See, e.g., Yaron Brook & Alex Epstein, What is Killing the Stock Market? Government
Regulation, MEDIALINK:

THE

AYN

RAND

INST.

(July

23,

2002),

available at

http://www.aynrand.org/medialink/killingthestockmarket.html (last visited June 16, 2003).
278. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that
shrinkwrap agreements can be used to limit a user's fair use of a product under copyright law
regardless of questions as to the copyrightability of the database under consideration in the case).
279. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (2000) (contemplating copyrights and limitations on copyrights in
computer programs); Copyright Act, 1968, § 10 (Austl.) (defining "literary work" to include
computer program or compilation of computer programs).
280. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (semiconductor chip rights); Circuit Layouts Act, 1989, (Austl.).
281. See Directive on the Protection of Databases, supra note 5.

282. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201(a)(l)(A), (a)(2), (b).
283. Directive on Copyright, supranote 58, art. 6.
284. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1832.
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things.285 The market cannot, and will not, be an effective guardian of
relevant competing interests in information without a legislative impetus
to do so.
Government involvement under the model presented in this Article,
although perhaps more significant than is currently the case, would not be
a major drain on government time or resources. What is contemplated here
is the government clarifying the nature of the legal obligations imposed on
information property owners and supporting the enforcement of these
obligations. As noted previously, the government has already done this for
more traditional forms of Property 86 so there is no reason to think that this
would be an impossible task in the information property context.
There would be a number of ways of going about this in practice. One
of the most simple would be the creation of a set of principles about
competing interests in information property following detailed debate
about the types of legal duties that should be imposed on information
property owners as an incident of ownership. These principles could be
drafted by a congressional committee or by the executive government.
Even better, the principles could be drafted at the international level
through the auspices of an organization like the WIPO, and could address
some of these issues on a global scale. It might then be incumbent on
courts and legislatures to consider these principles when implementing and
enforcing legislation and interpreting commercial practices involving
information property, particularly if the principles were adopted in the
form of an international agreement between nations with developed
information economies.
Naturally, any model requiring legislation at any level would have to
cope with the realities of constitutional limitations on legislative power
within variousjurisdictions. This can be particularly problematic in federal
285. For example, the lobbying by the movie industry for the enactment of the DMCA. See
David Passmore, Lobby Hollywood, Not Washington, BuS. CoMM. REV., Apr. 2002, at 16-17,
availableat http://www.bcr.com/bcrmag/2002/04/p. 16.asp (last visited June 16,2003); Recording
Indus. Assoc. of Am., Law, Politics,andPolicyasThey ImpactDRM, availableat http://www.infomech.com/drm_policy.html (last visited June 16, 2003). Other examples include the actions
initiated and lobbied for by the movie industry and other digital industries for the enforcement of
the DMCA. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294,344-45 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), aff'd, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001); Electronic Frontier Foundation, IntellectualProperty:
DigitalMillennium CopyrightAct (DMCA): U.S. v. ElcomSoft & Sklyarov Archive (reviewing the
Sklyarov/Elcomsoft litigation involving criminal sanctions for violations of the DMCA in respect
to e-book products), at http://www.eff.org/IP/DMCA/US_v_Elcomsoft/ (last visited June 1, 2003);
Electronic Frontier Foundation, Norway v. Johansen Case: CriminalChargesforAccessing Own
DVD (describing the lobbying by the United States government at the behest of the movie industry
for the criminal prosecution in Norway of Jan Johansen who originally decrypted the technological
protection measure used to prevent DVD copying), at http://www.eff.org/IPNideo/
DeCSS_prosecutions/JohansenDeCSS-case/ (last visited June 1, 2003).
286. See supra Part III.
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systems, such as the United States, where federal legislative powers are
significantly limited by the Constitution. There is no general legislative
power to modify information property rights, although some specific
obligations could be imposed under existing copyright and patent
legislation in keeping with any broader information property principles
developed under a property rights versus duties model of information
property.
It is beyond the scope of this Article to address these constitutional
issues in detail, particularly as different constitutional issues will arise in
different countries in the context of a global problem like balancing
competing interests in information. However, if a scheme such as that
described in this Article were to be adopted in any country, issues of
legislative competence would be a significant part of the picture.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

We have obviously accepted an increasing notion of information
property in recent years, and this has brought with it a number of practical
and theoretical problems. Courts and legislatures have not seriously
thought about some of the long-term impacts on society of accepting
powerful property rights in information without imposing appropriate
checks and balances on the exercise of those rights. Battles to strike a more
appropriate balance continue to be fought in legislatures and courts around
the world.287
However, the battles do not end with the acceptance or non-acceptance
of certain types of information property. Once a certain amount or type of
information property has been created, we should consider what we might
learn from traditional Property frameworks about the necessary checks and
balances in a Property system to ensure the protection of competing
private interests in relevant Property. The real Property system contains
many examples of situations where a Property holder is obliged to act in
a manner that protects particular competing interests of others in the
relevant Property-notably where those competing interests arise from a
competing contractual and/or proprietary right to those of the Property
288
owner.

287. Some examples of this battle are in currently proposed legislation to limit the operation
of the DMCA. See, e.g., Digital Choice and Freedom Act of 2002, H.R. 5522, 107th Cong. (2002)
(permiting the circumvention of"content protection" technologies in order to make non-infringing
uses of copyrighted works); Digital Media Consumers' Rights Act of 2002, H.R. 107, 107th Cong.
(2002) (restoring consumers' fair use rights by amending § 1201 of the DMCA to allow
circumvention of copy protection for non-infringing uses of the material). There are also calls to
review the operation of the E.U. Database Directive. See, e.g., Colston, supra note 63.
288. See supra notes 200-02 and accompanying text.
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Although we obviously need to convince courts and legislatures to do
more to protect the public domain of information and ideas,289 we also
need to ensure that, where information property is created, it is not
exploited unfairly to the detriment of those with legitimate competing
interests in relevant information. To date, our efforts to address this
question have met with limited success. Part of the reason for this lack of
success may derive from the ways in which we have approached these
issues in the past. We have basically utilized a piecemeal, case-by-case
methodology relying on arguments about fair use in the copyright2 and
database contexts,291 compulsory licensing in the copyright and patent
contexts, 292 privacy rights in the face of proprietary rights in databases, 293
and moral rights in the face of copyrighted works.294
We might improve the balance between proprietary interests and other
competing private interests in information if we adopted some overall
principles, derived from dynamics inherent in traditional Property systems,
that might better balance these interests in information. In particular, we
could utilize the notion that along with the grant of a property right in
information come associated legal duties owed to others with legitimate
interests in that information. We could encourage national and, ultimately,
international debates on this issue to derive a set of principles that could
then inform the development of future limitations on information property
rights. The focus should be on ensuring that information property holders
shoulder a fair share of the burden of protecting important competing
interests in information and that governments are prepared to help monitor
and enforce these legal duties.
Although the information property concept can be a troubling
development, the idea of Property can also be helpful in developing some
new checks and balances within an information property system. Difficult
questions about protecting general public interests in relation to
information property also need to be addressed alongside the model
presented here for protecting private interests in relevant information
property. Maybe if we start drawing from traditional Property theory to
help balance private interests in existing information property, we can
think more broadly about utilizing some basic dynamics from traditional
289. James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement and the Construction of the Public
Domain, 66 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 39 (2003).
290. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
29 1. Directive on the Protection of Databases, supra note 5, art. 9.
292. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (compulsory licensing of certain non-dramatic musical works in the
United States); Patents Act, 1977, c. 37, § 48 (Eng.) (compulsory licensing of English patents).
293. See Directive on Data Protection, supra note 135.
294. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106A(a)(l )-(a)(2) (United States attribution rights); id. § !06A(a)(3) (United
States integrity rights); Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, c. 48, §§ 77-95 (Eng.) (English
moral rights provisions).
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Property theory to more effectively protect general public interests in
information and the public domain of information and ideas.295

295. Some work is already taking place in this direction. See Damstedt, supra note 18;
Madison, supra note 6; Ryan, supra note 212.
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